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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Paired Kidney Exchange (PKE) programs seek to overcome any incompatibility (of blood
or tissue types)1 of living donor-patient pairs by arranging swaps of donors among several
pairs [8, 9, 30]. PKE programs work as clearing houses that periodically search for
mutually compatible exchanges of donors in a pool of donor-patient pairs. In order to find
such mutually compatible exchanges, PKE programs need to elicit relevant information
from patients (and their doctors) and to overcome feasibility constraints that are absent in
standard problems of allocation of indivisible goods. Specifically, PKE programs involve
the cooperation and coordination of several transplantation units at different medical
centers. Thus, the complexity of the logistics makes exchanges involving too many donor
patient-pairs unfeasible.2 For this reason, real-life PKE programs have generally focused
on maximizing the number of simultaneous compatible organ exchanges between two
donor-patient pairs, although swaps involving more than two pairs are also carried out.
To deal with situations where a donor-patient pair may be necessary in more than one
compatible exchange of donors, real-life PKE programs usually give priority to particular
patients in much the same way as happens in the allocation of kidneys obtained from
cadaveric donors.3
Living-donor kidney transplantation yields excellent results in terms of life expectancy
of the graft compared to kidney transplantation from cadaveric organs [8, 13]. This fact
explains the prevalent approach in PKE programs, which assumes that patients only care
about receiving a compatible kidney. Recent medical research, however, supports the idea
that different compatible kidneys can have substantially different outcomes. The age and
the health status of the donor, in fact, have a major impact on the expected survival of
1A patient and a donor are incompatible if the patient body will immediately reject the donor’s kidney
after the graft, and thus the transplantation is deemed not viable.
2There is growing interest in the creation of non-simultaneous, extended altruistic-donor chains that
try to avoid such limitations. A donor chain starts with an altruistic donor willing to donate to anyone
needing a kidney transplant without having a related recipient [4, 28, 40].
3This is the case of the New England PKE program [31, 32]. Similar protocols are adopted by other
centralized PKE programs implemented in countries like Korea, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom,
Spain, and the United States with its UNOS National Pilot Program for Kidney Paired Donation [2, 3,
17, 20, 25, 27].
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the graft [11, 12, 22, 38].4 This observation has important implications for modeling PKE.
First, the heterogeneity of transplantation outcomes may affect participants’ incentives.
Secondly, it provides a justification for the participation in PKE programs of patients
with a compatible willing donor. These pairs may have incentives to participate in PKE
programs since the patient could obtain a kidney that results in higher life-expectancy
than that of her donor’s kidney. The participation of compatible pairs can dramatically
increase the chances of finding compatible swaps for incompatible pairs, and boost the
transplantation rate [11, 30, 32, 33].
We model PKE clearing houses as rules that assign the donors’ kidneys to the pa-
tients taking into account patients’ preferences over available kidneys. Each patient’s
preferences depend on the donors’ characteristics that determine compatibility as well
as life expectancy after transplantation. The pool of available kidneys can be parti-
tioned into groups of kidneys of similar quality corresponding to the donors’ age groups.
Patients are interested in receiving a compatible kidney, but if possible they prefer a
kidney from a younger donor. This observation suggests the analysis of a restricted do-
main of preferences: the age based preference domain. In this domain, we study rules
that satisfy individual rationality,5 efficiency restricted by the logistic constraints, and
strategy-proofness.6 Those properties are incompatible for rules that allow for simulta-
neous swaps involving more than two donor-patient pairs. Hence, we focus on rules that
only allow for pairwise exchanges among two donor-patient pairs. We propose a family
of rules – age based priority rules – that adapt the PKE protocols used in practice to the
age based preference domain. According to age based priority rules, patients sequentially
select the pairwise assignments they prefer from the set of individually rational pairwise
assignments, and patients’ positions in the sequential choice procedure are determined
by the age of their donors. If patients can strictly rank all compatible kidneys, then age
4For instance, Øien et al. [22] confirm that the donor’s age and health status have a crucial role in the
case of living donations. A donor over 65 years old is associated with a higher risk of graft loss at every
time point after transplantation. There is more controversy in the medical literature regarding the effects
of other characteristics such as the similarity of tissue types between patients and donors [8, 13, 23, 24].
5A rule satisfies individual rationality if patients never prefer the initial assignment where no kidney
swap is performed to the outcome prescribed by the rule.
6A rule satisfies strategy-proofness if patients never have incentives to misrepresent their preferences.
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based priority rules are characterized by our three natural properties. If patients may
be indifferent among compatible kidneys, the rules that satisfy the above properties and
the auxiliary property of non–bossiness select assignments that maximize the number of
exchanges among pairs with the youngest donors and sequentially among pairs in different
age groups according to a priority ordering based on donors’ age.7
Our positive results rely on the analysis of the existence of strict core assignments in
the non-monetary exchange problem defined by PKE. A kidney assignment is in the strict
core if no group of patients can (weakly) benefit by swapping donors among themselves.
Under strict preferences and no feasibility constraints, the strict core is single-valued
and the rule that selects the unique core allocation satisfies strategy-proofness and many
other desirable properties [5, 18, 19, 29, 35]. This is not the case when indifferences
are allowed and/or there are feasibility constraints [1, 10, 16]. For general assignments
problems with non-empty strict core, So¨nmez [36] shows that there are rules that satisfy
individual rationality, (constrained) efficiency, and strategy-proofness only if the strict
core is unique. That result is crucial for our analysis under strict preferences and pairwise
exchanges, since in this case the strict core coincides with the assignment selected by an
age based priority rule. In the general case with indifferences, the strict core may be
empty, but under our domain restriction, we show that there are rules that satisfy those
desirable properties, and such rules are naturally related to age based priority rules.
This paper contributes to the kidney exchange literature initiated by Roth et al. [30].
In recent years, PKE has received a considerable interest from both a theoretical and a
practical design point of view. Most works have considered the framework that incor-
porates specific features consistent with the medical approach to PKE in New England
[14, 31, 32, 34, 40–42]. That approach assumes that only incompatible pairs participate
in PKE, and that patients are indifferent between two compatible kidneys. In this paper,
we introduce a restricted domain of preferences, which allows for strict preferences over
compatible kidneys and provides incentives for compatible pairs to enroll on PKE pro-
grams, but inevitably introduces additional structure for satisfactory rules. Finally, we
refer to two related recent papers. So¨nmez and U¨nver [37] analyze the structure of Pareto
7A rule satisfies non-bossiness if, whenever a change in a patient’s preferences does not affect the
kidney she receives, it does not modify any other patient’s assignment.
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efficient matchings when compatible pairs are admitted into PKE in the New England
PKE framework. In that paper, the sole motivation for the participation of compatible
pairs is altruism. Nicolo` and Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez [21] propose a model where patients’
preferences are unrestricted but the only private information is the minimal quality of the
kidney that each patient requires to undergo transplantation. In that framework, under
any arbitrary restriction on the number of pairs involved in exchanges, no rule satisfies
individual rationality, (constrained) efficiency, and strategy-proofness.8
Before proceeding with the formal analysis, we briefly outline the contents of the
remainder of this paper. In Section 2, we present basic notation and definitions. In
Section 3, we introduce the concept of age based preferences. In Section 4, we state our
results. In Section 5, we conclude. We provide all the proofs in the Appendix.
2 Basic Notation
Consider a finite society consisting of a set N = {1, . . . , n} of patients (n ≥ 3) who need
a kidney for transplantation. Each patient has a potential donor, and Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωn}
denotes the set of kidneys available for transplantation. For each patient i, ωi refers to
the kidney of patient i’s donor. We assume that all available kidneys are obtained from
living donors and each patient has only one potential donor.
Each patient i is equipped with a complete, reflexive, and transitive preference relation
%i on Ω. We denote byi the associated strict preference relation and by∼i the associated
indifference relation. Let P denote the set of all preferences. We call %= (%i)i∈N ∈ Pn a
preference profile. For each patient i and each %∈ PN , %−i∈ Pn−1 denotes the restriction
of the profile % for all the patients excluding i. We assume that patients’ preferences are
further restricted, so that for each patient i her preferences belong to a subset Di ⊂ P .
We denote by D ≡ ×i∈NDi ⊆ PN a domain of preference profiles over kidneys.
8Zenios [43] also considers PKE where patients care about the quality of the outcome in a dynamic
setting but there is no information to be elicited from the patients. The focus is on the optimal assignment
of donor-patient pairs to direct exchange programs or indirect exchange programs, where patients may
swap their incompatible donor to gain priority on the waiting list.
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An assignment a is a bijection from kidneys to patients. For each patient i and each
assignment a, ai denotes the kidney assigned to i by a. Whenever ai = ωi, we consider
that either patient i continues in dialysis or – if she is compatible with her donor – she
receives her donor’s kidney. Let A be the set of all assignments.
Kidneys are assigned to patients by forming cycles of patient–donor pairs. In each
cycle, every patient receives a kidney from the donor of some patient in the cycle, and
her donor’s kidney is transplanted to another patient in the cycle. For each assignment
a, let pia be the finest partition of the set of patients such that for each p ∈ pia and each
i ∈ p, there are j, j′ ∈ p, with ai = ωj and aj′ = ωi.9 For each assignment a the partition
pia is unique and well-defined. We define cardinality of a as the maxp∈pia #p.
10 The
cardinality of an assignment refers to the size of the largest cycle formed in the assignment.
For each k ∈ N, k ≤ n, we say that the assignment a is k–feasible if a’s cardinality
is not larger than k. Let Ak be the set of all k–feasible assignments.
Given a preference domain D, a rule is a mapping ϕ : D → A. Since we consider feasi-
bility constraints, for some k < n, we focus on rules that only select k-feasible assignments,
ϕ : D → Ak.
The most binding feasibility restriction appears when only exchanges between two
donor-patient pairs are admitted. An assignment a is a pairwise assignment if a ∈ A2.
A rule ϕ is a pairwise exchange rule if ϕ : D → A2.
We are interested in rules that satisfy the following standard properties.
Individual Rationality. For each i ∈ N and each %∈ D, ϕi(%) %i ωi.
k–Efficiency. For each %∈ D, there is no a ∈ Ak such that for each i ∈ N ai %i ϕi(%)
and for some j ∈ N , aj j ϕj(%).
Note that for a rule ϕ : D → Ak, k-efficiency refers to efficiency restricted to the set
of feasible assignments.
9Note that i = j = j′ and ai = ωi are allowed.
10For each set S, #S refers to the number of elements of S. Thus, for each element p of the partition
pia, #p refers to the number of patients involved in the exchange cycle.
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Strategy-Proofness. For each i ∈ N , each%∈ D, and each%′i∈ Di, ϕi(%) %i ϕi(%′i,%−i) .
In addition to these basic properties, we consider one additional desirable property.
Non-bossiness. For each i ∈ N , each %∈ D, and each %′i∈ Di, ϕi(%) = ϕi(%′i,%−i)
implies ϕ(%) = ϕ(%′i,%−i).
Non-Bossiness is a standard technical property in environments that admit indif-
ferences. Since monetary transactions related to organ donation are almost universally
banned, non-bossiness has also a reasonable normative justification in PKE problems. A
rule that violates non-bossiness may give rise to illegal bribes among donor-patient pairs.
If a patient i changes her preference report and affects the outcome of patient j, then i
may have incentives to accept a monetary compensation from j in order to reverse her
report.
3 Age Based Preferences
In this section we present a new domain restriction that is directly inspired by the specifics
of PKE. We start by introducing some useful notation.
For each patient i and each preference %i∈ P , let D(%i) ≡ {ω ∈ Ω \ {ωi} | ω i ωi}
define the set of desirable kidneys for patient i. Alternatively, let ND(%i) ≡
{ω ∈ Ω \ {ωi} | ωi %i ω} define the set of undesirable kidneys for patient i.
The set D(%i) contains all the kidneys which lead to an improvement with respect to
i’s outside option ωi: that is, either staying in dialysis or receiving her donor’s kidney.
Conversely, ND(%i) contains all incompatible kidneys that lead to i’s rejection of the
graft as well as those kidneys that may lead to a poor transplantation outcome, and i
prefers to keep ωi rather than receive them.
The viability (non-rejection) of transplantation depends on the compatibility of tissue
and blood types that are idiosyncratic to each patient and donor. There are a series of
characteristics of the donors that are crucial in determining the final outcome in terms
of expected life-expectancy after transplantation. Specifically, donor’s age and health
status turn out to be the most important characteristics in determining the probability
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of long-term graft survival in the case of living donations. Both characteristics are quite
closely correlated and directly observable by transplant coordinators, and they affect all
the patients in the same way. The age of the donors does not determine the possibility of
rejection of a kidney by a patient. However, whenever a patient compares two desirable
kidneys, she prefers the kidney from the youngest donor. If the donors of both kidneys
are (approximately) of the same age, then she is indifferent between them. We therefore
assume that there is a characteristic, namely the age of the donor, according to which
available kidneys can be partitioned into groups of kidneys of the same quality. The
following notation formalizes this idea.
An age structure is a partition Π = {Π(1), . . . ,Π(m)} of Ω. We consider that for
each ω, ω′ ∈ Ω and l, l′ ∈ N, ω ∈ Π(l) and ω′ ∈ Π(l′) l ≤ l′ imply that the donor of ω is
not older than the donor of ω′. Thus, we call each element of the age structure an age
group.
Let Π = {Π(1), . . . ,Π(m)} be an age structure. For each patient i ∈ N , the preference
relation %i∈ P is a Π age based preference if for each ω, ω′ ∈ D(%i) and for each
ω¯ ∈ ND(%i):
(i) ω ∈ Π(j) and ω′ ∈ Π(k) and j < k imply ω i ω′,
(ii) ω, ω′ ∈ Π(j) implies ω ∼i ω′, and
(iii) ωi i ω¯.
Let DΠi denote the set of all Π age based preferences for patient i and let DΠ ≡ ×i∈NDΠi
denote the domain of Π age based preferences.
Without any loss of generality and to simplify notation, we henceforth assume that
for each age structure Π, for each i, j ∈ N , if i < j, ωi ∈ Π(l), and ωj ∈ Π(l′), then l ≤ l′.
We denote with Π∗ the natural age structure such that Π∗ = {Π∗(1), . . . ,Π∗(n)}
and for each l ≤ n, Π∗(l) = {ωl}. According to Π∗, kidneys are strictly ordered according
to the natural order that corresponds to donors’ ages. Of course, according to Π∗ age based
preferences, patients are never indifferent between two desirable kidneys. Alternatively,
let Π¯ denote the coarsest partition such that Π¯ = {Π¯(1)} with Π¯(1) = Ω. The domain
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DΠ¯ corresponds to the domain of dichotomous preferences introduced by Roth et al.
[31, 32]. According to Π¯ age based preferences, patients are always indifferent between
two desirable kidneys.
Throughout the paper we consider kidney exchange problems such that the age struc-
ture Π is sufficiently rich. That is, we consider partitions with at least two age groups
and we rule out the case in which the set of kidneys is partitioned in two sets and one of
them contains a unique element.11
Assumption A. The age structure Π is such that either #Π ≥ 3 or Π = {Π(1),Π(2)}
and #Π(1) ≥ 2 and #Π(2) ≥ 2.
4 Age Based Preferences and Priority Rules
4.1 A Preliminary Impossibility Result
In the general model of exchange of indivisible goods without feasibility restrictions, it
is well-known that it is possible to design rules that satisfy individual rationality, (n)–
efficiency, and strategy-proofness. For instance, when all agents are endowed with strict
preferences, the rule that selects Shapley and Scarf’s Top-Trading Cycle (TTC) algorithm
outcome for each preference profile satisfies these properties [35].12 However, according to
Theorem 1 in Nicolo` and Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez [21] these properties are no longer compatible
when there are feasibility constraints on the set of available allocations and the prefer-
ence domain is unrestricted. For age based domains, since donors’ characteristics have
a common effect on patients’ preferences, this negative result does not apply. Neverthe-
less, our first result highlights the tension among individual rationality, k-efficiency, and
strategy-proofness if assignments involving at least three donor-patient pairs are admitted.
11Assumption A is very natural in the PKE framework. It only plays a role in the proof of Theorem
1, and it does not affect the remaining results where we focus on pairwise exchange rules.
12See Alcalde-Unzu and Molis [1], Jaramillo and Manjunath [16] for adaptations of the TTC that
maintain these properties in preference domains that admit indifferences.
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Theorem 1. For each age structure Π and each k ∈ N such that 3 ≤ k ≤ n− 1, no rule
ϕ : DΠ → Ak satisfies individual rationality, k-efficiency, and strategy-proofness.
The proof of Theorem 1 replicates the argument of proof of Theorem 1 in Nicolo` and
Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez [21]. For each Π that satisfies Assumption A, the preference profiles
used in the proof of that result belong to DΠ. Because Nicolo` and Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez [21]
study rules defined on the unrestricted domain of preferences, both theorems are logically
independent.13 Theorem 1 has no implication for k = 2 and in what follows we focus on
pairwise exchange rules.
4.2 Age Based Priority Rules
The literature on PKE has focused on priority mechanisms that resemble the protocols
commonly used to allocate cadaveric organs [31, 32]. In this section, we provide specific
definitions to tailor priority mechanisms to PKE problems when patients are equipped
with age based preferences.
A priority ordering σ is a permutation of patients (σ : N → N) such that the
k-th patient in the permutation is the patient with the k-th priority. Let σ∗ denote the
natural priority ordering such that for each i ∈ N , σ∗(i) = i. For each age structure
Π and each priority ordering σ, we say that σ respects Π if for every i, j ∈ N , ωi ∈ Π(l),
ωj ∈ Π(l′), and l < l′ imply σ(i) < σ(j).
For each %∈ Pn, let I(%) ≡ {a ∈ A2 | for each i ∈ N ai %i ωi} denote the set of all
individually rational pairwise assignments.
Priority Algorithm. Fix a permutation of the patients σ, and a preference profile
%∈ PN :
• Let Mσ0 (%) = I(%).
• For each t ≤ n, let Mσt ⊆Mσt−1 be such that:
Mσt (%) =
{
a ∈Mσt−1 | for no b ∈Mσt−1(%), bσ−1(t) σ−1(t) aσ−1(t)
}
.
13If Assumption A is dropped, we can provide a similar impossibility result for 3 ≤ k ≤ n− 2.
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Note that Mσn is well defined, non-empty, and essentially single-valued.14
A pairwise exchange rule ϕ : D → A2 is a priority rule if there is a priority ordering
σ such that for each %∈ D, ϕ(%) ∈ Mσn(%). We denote by ψσ a priority rule with
priority ordering σ. Given an age structure Π, a pairwise priority rule ψσ is an age
based priority rule if σ respects Π.15
A priority rule proceeds as a serial dictatorship rule in which patients sequentially
select their preferred allocations in I(%).16 Age based priority rules assign priority to
patients based on the age of their donors. Since all patients prefer younger desirable
donors to older ones, age based priority rules are normatively appealing because they give
priorities to those patients who bring the most valuable endowments to the PKE program.
Moreover, age based priority rules provide incentives to patients (and to the transplant
centres with which they are enrolled) to participate in centralized PKE programs instead
of looking for alternative private arrangements among groups of donor-patient pairs. To
show these features of the age based priority rules, we introduce the concept of the core
in pairwise PKE problems. Note that we deal with pairwise exchange rules, so that and
without loss of generality, we only need to consider arrangements involving up to two
donor-patient pairs.
For each pair a, b ∈ A2, each pair {i, j} ⊂ N , and each %∈ PN , {i, j} weakly blocks
a at % via b if
(i) bi = ωj and bj = ωi,
14A set is essentially single-valued either if it is single-valued or if it contains more than one element
and all the patients are indifferent between any two elements in the set. That is, for each patient i, each
%∈ PN , and each a, a′ ∈Mσn(%), ai ∼i a′i.
15Note that a priority rule may be defined by different priority orderings. In fact, whenever the last
element of Π is a singleton, there are priority orderings σ, σ′ such that σ respects Π, σ′ does not respect
Π, and ψσ ≡ ψσ′ . See Remark 1 and Lemma 2 in the Appendix.
16In our pairwise PKE framework, a serial dictatorship (for a priority ordering σ) would be defined with
the same algorithm but starting from the setA2. Serial dictatorships play a central role in house allocation
problems, in which a set of objects has to be assigned to a set of agents but there are neither property
rights over the objects nor monetary transfers [15, 26, 39]. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [6] consider a problem
of random house allocation under common preferences over houses similar to age based preferences. In
that paper, a random version of serial dictatorship is termed a random priority mechanism.
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(ii) bi %i ai and bj %j aj, and either bi j ai or bj j aj (or both).
Alternatively, {i, j} strongly blocks a at % via b if
(i) bi = ωj and bj = ωi,
(ii) bi i ai and bj j aj.
For each %∈ Pn, an assignment a ∈ A2 is in the strict core of the pairwise
exchange problem associated with % –a ∈ C(%)– if a ∈ I(%) and there are no pair
{i, j} ⊆ N and assignment b ∈ A2 such that {i, j} weakly blocks a at % via b. Finally,
an assignment a ∈ A2 is in the weak core of the pairwise exchange problem
associated with % –a ∈ C˜(%)– if a ∈ I(%) and there are no pair {i, j} ⊆ N and
assignment b ∈ A2 such that {i, j} strongly blocks a at % via b. Note that if patients’
preferences over desirable kidneys are strict, the definitions of weak and strong blocking
are equivalent and the strict and the weak core coincide.
4.3 The Natural Age Structure Π∗: Strict Preferences
In this section, we analyze the natural age structure Π∗ that induces strict preferences
over desirable kidneys. This case provides interesting insights for the general case with
arbitrary age structures.
According to Π∗, each age group contains a single kidney and for each patient i,
Π∗(i) = {ωi}. In this case, only the natural ordering σ∗ respects Π∗. We denote with ψ∗
the age based priority rule according to the natural order σ∗. That is, ψ∗ ≡ ψσ∗ .
Note that for each %∈ DΠ∗ , Mσ∗n (%) is single-valued. Thus, ψ∗ is the unique age based
priority rule. In the following result, we state the close relation between ψ∗ and the strict
core in the domain DΠ∗ .
Proposition 1. For each %∈ DΠ∗, C(%) = {ψ∗(%)}.
With Proposition 1 at hand, we characterize the age based priority rule ψ∗ as the
unique pairwise exchange rule that satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, and strategy-
proofness in DΠ∗ .
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Theorem 2. A rule ϕ : DΠ∗ → A2 satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency and
strategy-proofness if and only if ϕ is the age based priority rule ψ∗.
The proof of Theorem 2 exploits a general result for exchange economies with indivis-
ible goods obtained by So¨nmez [36] on the relation between the existence of single-valued
strict cores and the existence of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness. It is not difficult to
prove that ψ∗ satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, and strategy-proofness in DΠ∗ .
By Proposition 1, ψ∗ always selects the unique assignment in the strict core of the asso-
ciated pairwise exchange problem. Then, by Theorem 1 in [36], ψ∗ is the only rule that
satisfies the proposed properties.
4.4 General Age Structures
In this section we consider arbitrary age structures Π = {Π(1), . . . ,Π(m)} with m ≥ 2.
Under an arbitrary age structure, age based priority rules retain many of the properties
that they possess in DΠ∗ . By their very definition, age based priority rules satisfy in-
dividual rationality and 2-efficiency. Although the strict core of the associated pairwise
exchange problem may be empty for some preference profile, every age based priority
rule selects assignments in the weak core.17 In the following theorem, we show that age
based priority rules satisfy strategy-proofness, and that they are the only priority rules
that fulfill this property.18
Theorem 3. For each age structure Π and each priority ordering σ, the priority rule ψσ
satisfies strategy-proofness on DΠ if and only if ψσ is an age based priority rule.
We devote the remainder of this section to providing further evidence of the central
position of age based priority rules among the rules that satisfy individual rationality,
2-efficiency, and strategy-proofness for arbitrary age based domains. We focus on rules
17For each age structure Π, the associated Π age based domain satisfies the non-odd-cycle condition
[7]. Thus, the weak core of the associated pairwise exchange problem is never empty.
18In fact, age based priority rules also satisfy the stronger property of weak coalitional strategy-proofness
in DΠ. Weak coalitional strategy-proofness requires that for each %∈ D, there does not exist T ⊆ N and
%′∈ DΠ such that for each i /∈ T %′i=%i, and for each j ∈ T ϕj(%′) j ϕj(%). In our framework, stronger
definitions of coalitional strategy-proofness are incompatible with the remaining properties [10].
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that satisfy the additional property of non-bossiness. Clearly, age based priority rules
satisfy non-bossiness. In the following lemma, we state an important feature of the rules
that satisfy non-bossiness together with our standard properties.
Lemma 1. If ϕ : DΠ → A2 satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, strategy-proofness,
and non-bossiness, then for each i, j ∈ N and %∈ DΠ, ωi ∈ D(%j) and ωj ∈ D(%i) imply
either ϕi(%) %i ωj or ϕj(%) %j ωi (or both).
An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 is that our properties preclude the maximiza-
tion of the number of patients that receive a desirable kidney. This is in sharp contrast
with the results in the dichotomous domain framework presented by Roth et al. [31]. Ev-
ery pairwise exchange rule defined in the domain DΠ¯ that satisfies individual rationality
and 2-efficiency maximizes the number of patients who receive a desirable transplant. We
illustrate this fact in the following example.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, Π(1) = {ω1, ω2}, and Π(2) = {ω3, ω4}. Consider
the preference profile %∈ DΠ such that D(%1) = {ω2, ω3, ω4}, D(%2) = {ω1, ω3, ω4},
D(%3) = {ω1} , and D(%4) = {ω2}. Let a = (ω3, ω4, ω1, ω2). According to a, four
transplantations are performed and a ∈ I(%). By Lemma 1, however, for each rule
ϕ : DΠ → A2 that satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and
non-bossiness, ϕ(%) = (ω2, ω1, ω3, ω4).
Adding non-bossiness to the list of desirable properties for rules has a second important
consequence. A rule that satisfies our list of properties always selects assignments in the
weak core of the associated pairwise exchange problem.
Proposition 2. If ϕ : DΠ → A2 satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, strategy-
proofness, and non-bossiness, then for each %∈ DΠ, ϕ(%) ∈ C˜(%).
While a full characterization of the rules that satisfy individual rationality, 2-efficiency,
strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness, seems to be out of reach, we can provide further
insights into the structure of such rules. Lemma 1 and Example 1 suggest, that according
to a rule that satisfies the above properties, the number of tranplants involving pairs with
donors in Π(1) is maximized. We define a new class of pairwise exchange rules that extend
this intuition to all age groups.
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For each a ∈ A2, each t, t′ ∈ N with t ≤ t′ and t′ ≤ m, let
Mt,t′(a) ≡
i ∈ N
∣∣∣∣∣∣ai 6= ωi & either ωi ∈ Π(t) and ai ∈ Π(t
′)
or ωi ∈ Π(t′) and ai ∈ Π(t)
 .
That is, Mt,t′(a) contains patients with a donor in Π(t) who receive a kidney in Π(t
′)
and patients with a donor in Π(t′) who receive a kidney in Π(t). For each a ∈ A2, let
P1,1(a) ≡ ∅ and define recursively for each t, t′ ∈ N , such that {t, t′} 6= {1, 1}, t ≤ t′ and
t′ ≤ m:
Pt,t′(a) ≡
 Pt,t′−1(a) ∪Mt,t′−1(a) if t < t′,Pt−1,m(a) ∪Mt−1,m(a) if t = t′.
Finally, for each a ∈ A2 and each t, t′ ∈ N with t ≤ t′ ≤ m, let
Qt,t′(a) =
{
a′ ∈ A2 | for each i ∈ Pt,t′(a), a′i = ai
}
.
A rule ϕ : DΠ → A2 is a sequentially maximizing exchange rule if for each
%∈ DΠ,
(i) ϕ(%) ∈ I(%), and
(ii) for each t, t′ ∈ N with t ≤ t′ ≤ m, for each a ∈ Qt,t′(ϕ(%)) ∩ I(%),
#Mt,t′(ϕ(%)) ≥ #Mt,t′(a).
Sequentially maximizing exchange rules propose assignments that maximize the num-
ber of exchanges within each age group and among different age groups following the
priority orderings induced by the age structure. These rules generalize one of the most
important features of the age based priority rules. According to sequentially maximizing
exchange rules, transplantations involving the most valuable kidneys are proposed first,
and then an iterative process follows with regard to the remaining age groups. To il-
lustrate the logic behind sequentially maximizing exchange rules, consider an initial age
structure with only two age groups Π = {Π(1),Π(2)}. Thus, Π(1) is the set of young
donors, and Π(2) is the set of mature donors. In this case, a sequential matching maximiz-
ing rule maximizes among the assignments in I(%) the number of transplants involving
only donor-patient pairs with young donors. Then, given the exchanges between pairs
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of patients with a young donor, it maximizes the number of swaps between pairs with a
young donor and pairs with a mature donor. Finally, given the exchanges arranged in the
previous stages, the rule maximizes the number of swaps involving donor-patient pairs
with mature donors. For more general age structures, a sequential matching maximiz-
ing rule proceeds sequentially in the same fashion. In the first stage, it maximizes the
number of exchanges among pairs with the youngest donors. In a second stage, given the
exchanges selected in the first stage, it maximizes the number of exchanges among pairs
with the youngest donors and pairs with donors in the second age group, If there are more
than two age groups. a sequential maximizing rules continues in the same fashion, max-
imizing the number of exchanges among pairs with the youngest donors and pairs with
donors in the third age group, and in subsequent stages with the remaining age groups.
Then it applies the same logic with pairs in the second age group and so on.
In the following theorem, we provide our more general result.
Theorem 4. If ϕ : DΠ → A2 satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, strategy-
proofness, and non-bossiness, then ϕ is a sequential matching maximizing rule.
Before concluding, it is worth noting that Theorem 4 implies that there may exist
assignments in the weak core that are never selected by a rule that satisfies our list of
properties.19
4.5 Extensions
In this section, we briefly discuss the robustness of our results and possible extensions of
our analysis.
In this paper, we have focused on a very narrow domain of preferences justified by the
PKE application. It is natural to consider the possibility of extending the results to less
19Assume N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and Π = {Π(1),Π(2)} = {{ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, {ω5, ω6}}. Let %∈ DΠ be
such that D(%1) = {ω2, ω3}, D(%2) = {ω1, ω4}, D(%3) = {ω1, ω5}, D(%4) = {ω2, ω6}, D(%5) = {ω3} ,
and D(%6) = {ω4}. Let a ∈ A2 be such that a = (ω2, ω1, ω5, ω6, ω3, ω4). It is easy to check that a ∈ C˜(%).
According to a, there are three compatible donor swaps, but only one between patients with a donor in
Π(1). A rule that satisfies our properties cannot choose a at % because it is possible to carry out two
exchanges involving donor-patients pairs in Π(1). (For instance, consider b = (ω3, ω4, ω1, ω2, ω5, ω6).)
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restricted domains of preferences. We can prove that for all preference domains that ad-
mit cyclical profiles in the sense that there are i, j, k ∈ N such that ωj i ωk j ωi k ωj,
there is no pairwise exchange rule that satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, and
strategy-proofness (Theorem 1, [21]). Unfortunately, the most natural extensions of age
based preferences generate such cyclical profiles. For instance, suppose that the quality of
kidneys depends on two observable characteristics that are not perfectly correlated: age
and health status. Kidneys can be ordered according to each of those characteristics, but
the relative importance of one characteristic with respect to the other is private informa-
tion. That is, each patient prefers a (compatible) kidney from a young and healthy donor
to an organ from a mature or unhealthy donor. However, two patients may differently
rank a kidney from a young donor in poor health condition and a kidney from a mature
donor in perfect health. If patients do not coincide on the characteristic most relevant to
defining their preferences, then the implicit preference domain admits cyclical profiles.20
What constitute the precise requirements on the domain of preferences that make our
properties compatible is an interesting open question.
We have assumed throughout the paper that each patient’s set of desirable kidneys
is private information of each patient and only the age structure is public information.
However, since compatibility issues are determined by blood tests directly carried out
by the PKE programs, transplant coordinators have access to all the relevant medical
information on donors and patients [2, 3, 21]. Thus, it is natural to consider a model
where patients (or their doctors) do not report their sets of compatible kidneys because it is
public information. In this scenario, there is a crucial item of information that still remains
private: the minimum quality of the compatible kidney required by a patient to undergo
transplantation. The introduction of additional information on the compatibility issue
would correspond to a framework where preferences are further restricted. The analysis
of this setting entails cumbersome notation and the results depend on the compatibility
information, but the intuition of our result and our main findings are robust to the
introduction of public information about donor–patient compatibility.
Finally, a natural extension of our model considers the possibility that patients may
20If all patients consider the same characteristic as the most important one, then there would be an
age structure Π such that patients’ preferences are Π age based.
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find more than one potential donor. Even if only one among the potential donors of
a patient donates her kidney, the fact that a patient may have many potential donors
can greatly increase the chances of finding mutually compatible pairs. The analysis and
conclusions of this model are similar to the one donor case. The fact that a patient may
find potential donors in different age groups highlights that the priority in the exchange
process is not assigned to patients with younger donors. Instead, the priority algorithm
looks for matches only involving younger donors first, and then sequentially follows the
same process among the donors of the different age groups. Notably, the extension of age
based priority rules to the multiple donors scenario does not provide incentives for the
patients to manipulate by withholding some potential donors.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed a framework that incorporates two important features of PKE, namely,
the existence of feasibility constraints in the proposed assignments and the existence of ob-
servable characteristic of kidneys – donors’ age – that affect the expected living standards
of the recipients and consequently patients’ preferences over outcomes. In this model,
we have shown that only PKE rules restricted to select pairwise assignments, and which
assign kidneys according to a priority based on donors’ ages, satisfy individual rationality,
efficiency, and strategy-proofness. We now briefly discuss now some implications of our
model for the design of PKE programs.
The main justification for our framework is the design of PKE protocols that encourage
the participation of compatible donor-patient pairs. In the standard model, the motivation
of compatible donor-patient pairs to participate in PKE programs is entirely altruistic
([32, 37]). In our model, compatible donor-patient pairs with relatively old donors may
be willing to enroll PKE programs that adopt age based priority rules because their
patients can receive organs with longer expected graft survival. In fact, the participation
of compatible pairs may represent the most important factor in expanding the number
of kidney paired exchanges. A recent study by Gentry et al. [11] uses simulated data
to prove that there may be large benefits for both incompatible pairs and compatible
pairs if compatible pairs are willing to participate in PKE programs. The participation
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of compatible pairs could dramatically reduce blood group imbalances in the pool of
compatible pairs.21 As a result, the match rate for incompatible pairs would double
from 28.2 to 64.5 percent for a single-center program and from 37.4 to 75.4 percent
for a national program. Therefore, the positive impact of allowing compatible pairs to
participate in PKE programs could offset the efficiency loss due to the restriction to
pairwise assignments.
6 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. The arguments follow the proof of Theorem 1 in Nicolo` and Rodr´ıguez-
A´lvarez [21]. We include the complete proof for the sake of completeness.
Let 3 ≤ k ≤ n− 1. Assume, by way of contradiction, that there are a partition Π and
a rule ϕ : DΠ → Ak such that ϕ satisfies individual rationality, k-efficiency, and strategy-
proofness in DΠ. Without loss of generality, by Assumption A, let ω1 ∈ Π(l), ω2 ∈ Π(l′),
ωk ∈ Π(l¯) and ωk+1 ∈ Π(l¯′) with l < l′ and l¯ < l¯′.22 Let %∈ DΠ be such that for each
i /∈ {k − 1, k + 1}, D(%i) = {ωi+1}, D(%k−1) = {ωk, ωk+1}, and D(%k+1) = {ω1, ω2}.
Let %′∈ DΠ be such that for each i 6= k − 1, %i=%′i, and D(%′k−1) = {ωk}. Under
profile %′, by individual rationality, either no object is assigned to any patient 1, . . . , k+1,
or patient k + 1 receives ω2, patient 1 receives ω1, and every other patient i receives ωi+1
(the kidney of her next to the right neighbor). By k-efficiency :
ϕ(%′) =

(1, ω1),
(i, ωi+1), ∀i = 2, . . . , k
(k + 1, ω2)
 .
21Most of group-0 donors can directly donate to their intended recipients. Hence, group-0 patients in
the incompatible donor-patient pool must rely on a scant number of group-0 donors and can rarely find
a match.
22For instance, we can assume that ω1 ∈ Π(1) and {ω2, ωk} ∈ Π(2), and ωk+1 ∈ Π(3). Alternatively,
we can have {ω1, ωk} ⊆ Π(1) and {ω2, ωk+1} ⊆ Π(2), and apply a convenient relabeling of patients and
donors in order to satisfy our notational assumption.
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By strategy-proofness, ϕk−1(%) %k−1 ϕk−1(%′) = ωk. Note that, according to %k−1, ωk
is patient k − 1’s preferred kidney. Then, ϕk−1(%) = ωk. By k-efficiency and individual
rationality, ϕ(%) = ϕ(%′).
Let %′′∈ DΠ be such that for each i 6= k + 1, %j=%′′j and D(%′′k+1) = {ω1}. The same
arguments we employed to determine ϕ(%′) apply here to obtain:
ϕ(%′′) =

(i, ωi+1)(modulo k + 1), ∀i /∈ {k, k − 1}
(k − 1, ωk+1),
(k, ωk)
 .
Note that ω1 = ϕk+1(%′′) = ϕk+1(%′′k+1,%−(k+1)) k+1 ϕk+1(%) = ω2 , which contradicts
strategy-proofness.
Proof of Proposition 1. Let %∈ DΠ∗ . We first prove that for each b ∈ A2 \ ψ∗(%),
b /∈ C(%) . If b /∈ I(%), then clearly b /∈ C(%). Let b ∈ I(%). Let i be the patient
such that bi 6= ψ∗i (%) and for each i′ ∈ N with i′ < i, bi′ = ψ∗i′(%). Let j be the patient
such that ψ∗i (%) = ωj. Note that since b ∈ I(%) and preferences over desirable kidneys
are strict, by the definitions of ψ∗ and i, we have i < j and ψ∗i (%) = ωj i bi. Because
ψ∗j (%) = ωi ∈ D(%j), for each i′ ∈ N such that ωi′ j ωi, i′ < i. Thus, since for each
i′ < i, ψ∗i′(%) = bi′ 6= ωj, we have ψ∗j (%) = ωi j bj. Hence, the pair {i, j} weakly blocks
b at % via ψ∗(%).
To conclude the proof, we show that ψ∗(%) ∈ C(%). Since ψ∗(%) ∈ I(%), there is no
single-patient that weakly blocks ψ∗(%) at %. Hence, we check that ψ∗(%) is not weakly
blocked by a pair of patients. Assume to the contrary that there are a pair {i, j} ⊂ N and
a ∈ A2 such that {i, j} weakly blocks ψ∗(%) at % via a. Without loss of generality, let
i < j. Since preferences over desirable kidneys are strict and a 6= ψ∗(%), ai = ωj i ψ∗i (%)
and aj = ωi j ψ∗j (%). Let j′ be the patient such that ψ∗i (%) = ωj′ . There are two cases:
Case i). j′ < i. Because %i∈ DΠ∗i and j′ < i < j, ωj′ i ωj = ai, which contradicts
{i, j} strongly blocking ψ∗(%) via a.
20
Case ii). i ≤ j′. By the definition of ψ∗, either ωi /∈ D(%j) or there is i′ with i′ < i,
such that ψ∗j (%) = ωi′ . In either case, ψ∗j (%) j ωi, which contradicts {i, j} weakly
blocking ψ∗(%) via a.
Since both cases are exhaustive, ψ∗(%) ∈ C(%), and by the arguments in the previous
paragraph, C(%) = {ψ∗(%)}.
Proof of Theorem 2. It is easy to check that ψ∗ satisfies individual rationality and 2-
efficiency. Consequently, we only show that ψ∗ satisfies strategy-proofness. Let i ∈ N ,
%∈ DΠ∗ and %′i∈ DΠ∗i . Assume first that, ψ∗i (%) = ψ∗i (%′i,%−i) , then ψ∗i (%) %i ψ∗i (%′i
,%−i). Assume now that ψ∗i (%) 6= ψ∗i (%′i,%−i) . Let j, j′ ∈ N be such that ψ∗i (%) = ωj
and ψ∗i (%′i,%−i) = ωj′ . There are two cases:
Case i). i = j. By the definition of ψ∗, ωj′ ∈ D(%′i)\D(%i), and ψ∗i (%) %i ψ∗i (%′i,%−i).
Case ii). i 6= j. By the definition of ψ∗(%), ωj ∈ D(%i) and therefore ωj i ωi. Since
ψ∗i (%) 6= ψ∗i (%′i,%−i), then either j′ < j with ωj′ ∈ D(%′i) \ D(%i), or j < j′, or
i = j′. In either case ψ∗i (%) %i ψ∗i (%′i,%−i).
Since both cases are exhaustive, ψ∗ satisfies strategy-proofness.
Next, we prove the necessity side. Let ϕ be a rule that satisfies individual rational-
ity, 2-efficiency, and strategy-proofness in DΠ∗ . Note that for each i ∈ N and %i∈ DΠ∗ ,
by the definition of age based preferences, for each a ∈ A2, ai ∼i ωi if and only if
ai = ωi. Moreover, for each a ∈ A2 such that ai %i ωi, there is %′i∈ DΠ∗ such that
D(%′i) = {bi ∈ D(%i) | bi %i ai}. Hence, the domain DΠ∗ satisfies Assumptions A and
B on the domain of preferences proposed by So¨nmez [36]. By Proposition 1, for each
%∈ DΠ∗ , C(%) = {ψ∗(%)} 6= ∅. By [36, Theorem 1], if there is a rule ϕ that satisfies
individual rationality, 2-efficiency, and strategy-proofness in DΠ∗ , then for each %∈ DΠ∗ ,
ϕ(%) ∈ C(%) . By the arguments in the previous paragraph, ψ∗ satisfies individual ratio-
nality, 2-efficiency, and strategy-proofness in DΠ∗ . Thus, ϕ = ψ∗.
The following remark and lemma are useful in the proof of Theorem 3. If the last
element of the age structure contains a single kidney (Π(m) = {ωn}), then there exist
priority orderings that do not respect the partition but do define priority rules that are
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equivalent to an age based priority rule. This situation may arise when the priority orders
of patient n and one patient with her donor’s kidney in Π(m−1) are switched with respect
to the priorities assigned by a priority order that respects Π.
Remark 1. For each age structure Π = {Π(1), . . . ,Π(m)} and each priority order σ that
does not respect Π, then
(i) either there are i, j, h ∈ N and l, l′ ≤ m such that ωi ∈ Π(l), ωj ∈ Π(l′) l < l′, and
σ(j) < σ(i) and σ(j) < σ(h),
(ii) or there are i, j ∈ N such that ωi ∈ Π(m − 1), {ωj} = Π(m), σ(j) = (n − 1) and
σ(i) = n.
Lemma 2. Let Π = {Π(1), . . . ,Π(m)} be such that #Π(m) = 1. Let the priority ordering
σ respect Π and let i, j ∈ N be such that ωi ∈ Π(m−1), {ωj} = Π(m), and σ(i) = (n−1).
If the priority ordering σ′ is such that for each h /∈ {i, j}, σ′(h) = σ(h), σ′(j) = (n− 1),
and σ′(i) = n, then for each %∈ DΠ, Mσn(%) =Mσ′n (%).
Proof. Let %∈ DΠ. Note that for each t ≤ (n−2),Mσt (%) =Mσ′t (%). For each h /∈ {i, j}
and each a, a′ ∈Mσn−2(%), ah ∼h a′h. There are three cases:
Case i). There are h /∈ {i, j} and a ∈ Mσn−2(%) such that ah = ωj. Since Π(m) =
{ωj}, for each b, b′ ∈ Mσn−2(%), bh = b′h = ωj, and bj = b′j = ωh and bj ∼j
b′j. Note that Mσn−1(%) = {a ∈ Mσn−2(%) | for no b ∈ Mσn−2(%), bi i ai}.
Since Mσn−1(%) ⊆Mσn−2(%) and for each b, b′ ∈ Mσn−2(%), bj ∼j b′j, Mσn(%) =
Mσn−1(%). With the same arguments, Mσ′n−1(%) = Mσ′n−2(%), and Mσ′n (%) ={
a ∈Mσ′n−2(%) | for no b ∈Mσ′n−2(%), bi i ai
}
. Since Mσn−2(%) = Mσ′n−2(%), we
have Mσn(%) =Mσ′n (%) .
Case ii). There is a ∈Mσn−2(%) such that aj = ωi. By Case i), for each b ∈Mσn−2(%),
bj ∈ {ωi, ωj}. First, we prove that for each b ∈ Mσn−2(%), bi ∈ {ωi, ωj}. Let
a ∈ Mσn−2(%) with aj = ωi. Assume to the contrary that there is h1 /∈ {i, j} such
that bh1 = ωi. Let ωh1 ∈ Π(l) (l ≤ m − 1.) Assume that ah1 /∈ Π(m − 1) \ {ωi},
then ah1 h1 bh1 , which is a contradiction since a, b ∈ Mσn−2(%) and h1 /∈ {i, j}.
Hence, ah1 ∈ Π(m − 1) \ {ωi}. Let i1 /∈ {i, j, h1} be such that ωi1 = ah1 . Assume
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that bi1 /∈ Π(l) \ {ωk1}, then either ai1 i1 bi1 or bi1 i1 ai1 , which is a contradiction
since a, b ∈Mσn−2(%) and i1 /∈ {i, j}. Therefore, bi1 ∈ Π(l)\{ωh−1}. Since Π(l) and
Π(m − 1) are finite sets, we can continue in the same fashion until we eventually
reach a contradiction. That is, there is t ≥ 2 such that either aht /∈ Π(m − 1) \
{ωi, ωi1 , . . . , ωit−1} or bit /∈ Π(l) \ {wh1 , . . . , ωht}. Hence, for each a ∈ Mσn−2(%),
ai ∈ {ωi, ωj}.
To conclude, since Mσn−2(%) ⊆ I(%), if there is a ∈ Mσn−2(%) such that aj = ωi,
then ωi ∈ D(%j) and ωj ∈ D(%i). Because for each b ∈ Mσn−2(%), bi ∈ {ωi, ωj}
and bj ∈ {ωi, ωj}, we have Mσn−1(%) = {a ∈ Mσn−2(%) | ai = ωj} = Mσn(%).
Analogously, Mσ′n−1(%) = {a ∈ Mσn−2(%) | aj = ωi} = Mσ′n (%). Thus, Mσn(%) =
Mσ′n (%).
Case iii). For each a ∈Mσn−2(%), we have that aj = ωj. Then, for each a, b ∈Mσn−2(%),
aj ∼j bj. Applying the arguments in Case i), we obtain Mσn(%) =Mσ′n (%).
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider a partition Π, we prove that if σ respects Π, then ψσ
satisfies strategy-proofness. The proof replicates with minimal variations the arguments
in the proof of Theorem 2 but we include them for the sake of completeness. To simplify
notation, we consider the natural priority ordering σ∗. The arguments apply directly
for every arbitrary priority ordering that respects Π. Let i ∈ N , %∈ DΠ and %′i∈ DΠi .
Assume first that, ψ∗i (%) = ψ∗i (%′i,%−i) , then ψ∗i (%) %i ψ∗i (%′i,%−i). Assume now that
that ψ∗i (%) 6= ψ∗i (%′i,%−i) . Let j, j′ ∈ N be such that ψ∗i (%) = ωj and ψ∗i (%′i,%−i) = ωj′ .
There are two cases:
Case i). i = j. By the definition of ψ∗, ωj′ ∈ D(%′i)\D(%i), and ψ∗i (%) %i ψ∗i (%′i,%−i).
Case ii). i 6= j. Assume first that i = j′. Since ψ∗i (%) = ωj 6= ωi = ψ∗i (%′i,%−i),
ωj ∈ D(%i), and therefore ψ∗i (%) %i ψ∗i (%′i,%−i). Finally, assume that i 6= j′. In this
case, there are l, l′ ∈ N such that ψ∗i (%) = ωj ∈ Π(l) and ψ∗i (%′i,%−i) = ωj′ ∈ Π(l′).
By the definition of ψ∗(%), either l′ < l with ωj′ ∈ D(%′i) \ D(%i), or l ≤ l′. In
either case ψ∗i (%) %i ψ∗i (%′i,%−i).
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Since both cases are exhaustive, ψ∗ satisfies strategy-proofness.
Next, consider a priority ordering σ such that the priority rule ψσ is not an age based
priority rule. Hence, the priority ordering σ does not respect Π. By Remark 1 and
Lemma 2, there are i, j, h ∈ N , and l, l′ ≤ m such that ωi ∈ Π(l), ωj ∈ Π(l′), l < l′,
σ(j) < σ(i) and σ(j) < σ(h). Let %∈ DΠ be such that D(%i) = {ωh}, D(%j) = {ωh} ,
and D(%h) = {ωi, ωj} . Clearly, ψσh(%) = ωj. Let %′h∈ DΠh be such that D(%′h) = {ωi} .
Then, by 2-efficiency, ψσh(%′h,%−h) = ωi , and ψσm(%′h,%−h) h ψσh(%) , which proves that
ψσ violates strategy-proofness.
Proof of Lemma 1. Assume to the contrary that there are i, j ∈ N and %∈ DΠ such
that there exist ωi ∈ D(%j) and ωj ∈ D(%i) but ωi j ϕj(%) and ωj i ϕi(%). Let
%1∈ DΠ be such that %1i=%i, %1j=%j, and for each h ∈ N \ {i, j}, D(%1h) = {ϕh(%)} .
Let h ∈ N \ {i, j}. By individual rationality, ϕh(%1h,%−h) ∈ {ωh, ϕh(%)}. By strategy-
proofness, ϕh(%1h,%−h) %1h ϕh(%) . Hence, ϕh(%1h,%−h) = ϕh(%) , and by non-bossiness,
ϕ(%1h,%−h) = ϕ(%) . Repeating the argument with the remaining patients (one at a
time), we obtain ϕ(%1) = ϕ(%) . Let %2∈ DΠ be such that D(%2i ) = {ωj, ϕi(%)} ,
D(%2j) = {ωi, ϕj(%)} and for each patient h /∈ {i, j}, %2h=%1h. By individual ratio-
nality and strategy-proofness, ϕi(%2i ,%1−i) = ϕi(%1). By non-bossiness, ϕ(%2i ,%1−i) =
ϕ(%1). Similarly, by individual rationality and strategy-proofness, ϕj(%2{i,j},%1−{i,j}) =
ϕj(%2i ,%1−i) . By non-bossiness, ϕ(%2{i,j},%1−{i,j}) = ϕ(%2i ,%1−i). Thus, ϕ(%2) = ϕ(%1) .
Let %3∈ DΠ be such that D(%3i ) = {ωj}, D(%3j) = {ωi}, and for each patient h /∈ {i, j},
%3h=%2h. By individual rationality and strategy-proofness, ϕi(%3i ,%2−i) = {ωi} . By indi-
vidual rationality, ϕj(%3i ,%2−i) ∈ {ωj, ϕj(%2)} . By 2-efficiency, ϕj
(
%3i ,%2−i
)
= ϕj (%2).
Finally, by individual rationality and strategy-proofness, ϕj(%3{i,j},%2−{i,j}) = {ωj} and
ϕi(%3{i,j},%2−{i,j}) = {ωi} , which violates 2-efficiency.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let %∈ DΠ. Assume to the contrary that ϕ satisfies individual
rationality, 2-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness, but ϕ(%) /∈ C˜(%). Since ϕ
satisfies individual rationality, and ϕ(%) ∈ I(%), there are an assignment a ∈ A2, and a
pair {i, j} ⊂ N such that the pair {i, j} strongly blocks ϕ(%) at % via a. Since ϕ satisfies
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individual rationality, ai = ωj ∈ D(%i), and aj = ωi ∈ D(%j). Because, {i, j} strongly
blocks ϕ(%) at % via a, ωj i ϕi(%) and ωi j ϕj(%), which contradicts Lemma 1.
Proof of Theorem 4. By individual rationality, for each %∈ DΠ, ϕ(%) ∈ I(%). We prove
(ii) of the definition of sequential maximizing rules by a series of steps.
Step 1: t = 1 and t′ = 1. Let %∈ DΠ. Assume to the contrary that there is a pairwise
exchange rule ϕ that satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and
non-bossiness but there are %∈ DΠ and a ∈ I(%) such that #M1,1(a) > #M1,1(ϕ(%)).
(By definition, for each a′ ∈ A2, P1,1(a′) = ∅.) Without any loss of generality, there exist
a set T ⊂ N and h, h′ ∈ N \T such that for each i ∈ T ∪{h, h′}, ωi ∈ Π(1), ϕh(%) /∈ Π(1),
ϕh′(%) /∈ Π(1) and:
(i) For each i ∈ T ∪ {h, h′}, there exists i′ ∈ (T ∪ {h, h′}) \ {i} such that ai = ωi′ .
(ii) For each j ∈ T , there exists j′ ∈ T \ {j} such that ϕj(%) = ωj′ .
There are two cases.
Case i). T = ∅. Clearly, ah = ωh′ and ah′ = ωh. Since a ∈ I(%), ωh ∈ D(%h′) and
ωh′ ∈ D(%h). Because ϕh(%) /∈ Π(1) and ϕh′(%) /∈ Π(1), this contradicts Lemma
1.
Case ii). T 6= ∅. Let %′∈ DΠ be such that for each i ∈ T ∪{h, h′}, %′i=%i, and for each
j /∈ T ∪ {h, h′}, D(%′j) = {ϕj(%)}. Let j /∈ T ∪ {h, h′}. By individual rationality,
ϕj(%′j,%−j) ∈ {ωj, ϕj(%)} . By strategy-proofness, ϕj(%′j,%−j) %′j ϕi(%) . Then,
ϕj(%′j,%−j) = ϕj(%) and by non-bossiness, ϕ(%′j,%−j) = ϕ(%). Repeating the
same argument exchanging the preference of each patient, we obtain ϕ(%′) = ϕ(%) .
Let %′′h∈ DΠh be such that D(%′′h) = {ah} ∈ Π(1). By individual rationality,
ϕh(%′′h,%′−h) ∈ {ωh, ah} . By strategy-proofness, ϕh(%′) %′h ϕh(%′′h,%′−h) . Hence,
ϕh(%′′h,%′−h) = ωh . By the definition of (%′′h,%′−h) and individual rationality, for
each j /∈ T ∪ {h, h′}, ϕj(%′′h,%′−h) ∈ {ωj, ϕj(%)}. By 2-efficiency, for each j /∈
T ∪ {h, h′}, ϕj(%′′h,%′−h) = ϕj(%). On the other hand, for each j′ ∈ T ∪ {h′},
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either there is i′ ∈ T ∪ {h′} such that ϕj′(%′′h%′−h) = ωi′ , or ϕj′(%′′h,%′−h) = ωj′ .
Moreover, since ϕ(%′′h,%′−h) ∈ A2 and ϕh(%′′h,%′−h) = ωh, there is h′′ ∈ T ∪ {h′}
such that ϕh′′(%′′h,%′−h) = ωh′′ . Let b ∈ A2 be such that for each i ∈ T ∪ {h, h′},
bi = ai and for each j /∈ T ∪ {h, h′}, bj = ϕj(%). Note that for each i ∈ T ∪ {h, h′},
bi ∈ Π(1). Then, for each i′ ∈ N \ {h, h′′}, bi′ %′i′ ϕi′(%′′h,%′−h), bh ′′h ϕh(%′′h,%′−h),
and bh′′ ′h′′ ϕh′′(%′′h,%′−h), which contradicts 2-efficiency.
Step 2: t = 1, t′ = 2. The result for t = 1 and t′ = 2, . . . ,m follows from slightly
modified arguments. Assume to the contrary that there is a pairwise exchange rule ϕ
that satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness, but
there are %∈ DΠ and a ∈ I(%) such that for each i ∈ P1,2 (ϕ(%)), ϕi(%) = ai but
#M1,2(a) > #M1,2 (ϕ(%)) .
Then, there are a set T ⊂ N \P1,2(ϕ(%)) and a pair of patients h, h′ ∈ N \T such that for
each i ∈ T ∪ {h, h′} ωi ∈ (Π(1) ∪ Π(2)), ωh ∈ Π(1), ωh′ ∈ Π(2), ϕh(%) /∈ (Π(1) ∪ Π(2)),
ϕh′(%) /∈ Π(1), and
(i) For each i ∈ T with ωi ∈ Π(1) there exists i′ ∈ T with ωi′ ∈ Π(2) such that
ϕi(%) = ωi′ .
(ii) For each j ∈ T ∪ {h, h′} with ωj ∈ Π(1), there is j′ ∈ T ∪ {h, h′} with ωh′ ∈ Π(2)
such that aj = ωj′ .
Note that h, h′ /∈ P1,2(ϕ(%)). There are two cases.
Case i). T = ∅, with the arguments in the proof for t = 1 and t′ = 1, we obtain a
contradiction with Lemma 1.
Case ii). T 6= ∅. Let %′∈ DΠ be such that for each i ∈ T ∪{h, h′}, %′i=%i and for each
j /∈ T∪{h, h′}, D(%j) = {ϕj(%)}. By individual rationality, ϕj(%′j,%−j) ∈ {ωj, ϕj(%)} .
By strategy-proofness, ϕj(%′j,%−j) %′j ϕi(%) . Then, ϕj(%′j,%−j) = ϕj(%) and by
non-bossiness, ϕ(%′j,%−j) = ϕ(%). Repeating the same argument exchanging the
preference of each patient, we obtain ϕ(%′) = ϕ(%) . Let %′′h′∈ DΠh′ be such that
D(%′′h′) = {ah′} ∈ Π(1). By individual rationality, ϕh′(%′′h′ ,%′−h′) ∈ {ωh′ , ah′} . By
26
strategy-proofness, ϕh′(%′) %′h′ ϕh′(%′′h′ ,%′−h′) . Hence, ϕh′(%′′h′ ,%′−h′) = ωh′ . By the
definition of (%′′h′ ,%′−h′) and by individual rationality, for each j /∈ T ∪ {h, h′},
ϕj(%′′h,%′−h) ∈ {ωj, ϕj(%)} . By 2-efficiency, for each j /∈ T∪{h, h′}, ϕj(%′′h′ ,%′−h′) =
ϕj(%) On the other hand, for each j′ ∈ T ∪ {h}, either there is i′ ∈ T ∪ {h} such
that ϕj′(%′′h′%′−h′) = ωi′ , or ϕj′(%′′h′ ,%′−h′) = ωj′ . Since ϕ(%′′h′ ,%′−h′) ∈ A2 and
ϕh′(%′′h′ ,%′−h′) = ωh′ , there is h′′ ∈ T ∪ {h} such that ϕh′′(%′′h,%′−h) = ωh′′ . Note
that since for each i 6= h′, D(%′i) ⊆ D(%i) and D(%′′h′) ⊆ (%h′ ,%′−h′), and ϕ
satisfies individual rationality, ϕ( %′′h′ ,%′−h′) ∈ I(%). Since for each a ∈ I(%),
#M1,1(ϕ(%)) ≥ #M1,1(a), we have that for each j′ ∈ T ∪ {h} with ωj′ ∈ Π(1),
ϕj′(%′′h′ ,%′−h′) ∈ Π(2) ∪ {ωj′}. Let b ∈ A2 be such that for each i ∈ T ∪ {h, h′},
bi = ai and for each j /∈ T ∪ {h, h′}, bj = ϕj(%′′h′ ,%′−h′) = ϕj(%). Note that
for each i /∈ T ∪ {h, h′} with ωi ∈ Π(1), bi ∈ Π(2) and for each i′ ∈ T ∪ {h, h′}
with ωi′ ∈ Π(2), bi′ ∈ Π(1). Then, for each j ∈ N \ {h′, h′′}, bj %′j ϕj(%′′h′ ,%′−h′),
bh′ ′′h′ ϕh′(%′′h′ ,%′−h′), and bh′′ ′′h′′ ϕh′(%′′h′ ,%′−h′), which contradicts 2-efficiency.
In order to conclude the proof, we can apply iteratively the arguments in the proof of
Step 2, to prove the result for t = 1 and t′ = 3, . . . ,m. Then, given that the result is true
for t = 1, t′ = m, the arguments in Step 2 directly apply to prove the result for t = 2 and
t′ = 2, and we can proceed iteratively with all the remaining steps till we reach t = m,
t′ = m.
References
[1] J. Alcalde-Unzu and E. Molis. Exchange of indivisible goods and indifferences: Ab-
sorbing Sets mechanisms. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(1):1–16, 2011.
[2] I. Ashlagi and A. E. Roth. New challenges in multi-hospital kidney exchange. Amer-
ican Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, (102 (3)):354–359, 2012.
[3] I. Ashlagi and A. E. Roth. Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital
kidney exchange. Forthcoming, Theoretical Economics, 2013.
27
[4] L. M. Ausubel and T. Morrill. Sequential kidney exchange, 2013. Forthcoming,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2013
[5] C. G. Bird. Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Eco-
nomics Letters, 14(4):309 – 313, 1984.
[6] A. Bogomolnaia and H. Moulin. A simple random assignment problem with a unique
solution. Economic Theory, 19(3):623–636, 2002.
[7] K. Chung. On the existence of stable roommate matchings. Games and Economic
Behavior, 33:206–230, 2000.
[8] F. L. Delmonico. Exchanging kidneys – advances in living-donor transplantation.
The New England Journal of Medicine, 350:1812–1814, 2004.
[9] F. L. Delmonico, G. S. Lipkowitz, P. E. Morrissey, J. S. Stoff, J. Himmelfarb, W. Har-
mon, M. Pavlakis, H. Mah, J. Goguen, R. Luskin, E. Milford, G. B. M. Chobanian,
B. Bouthot, M. Lorber, and R. J. Rohrer. Donor kidney exchanges. American Journal
of Transplantation, 4:1628–1634, 2004.
[10] L. Ehlers. Coalitional strategy-proof house allocation. Journal of Economic Theory,
105(2):298 – 317, 2002.
[11] S. E. Gentry, D. L. Segev, M. Simmerling, and R. A. Montgomery. Expanded kidney
paired donation through participation by compatible pairs. American Journal of
Transplantation, 7:99–107, 2007.
[12] D. W. Gjertson. Explainable variation in renal transplant outcomes: A comparison
of standard and expanded criteria donors. Clinical Transplants, 2004:303 – 314, 2004.
[13] D. W. Gjertson and J. Cecka. Living unrelated donor kidney transplantation. Kidney
International, 58:491–499, 2000.
[14] J. W. Hatfield. Pairwise kidney exchange: Comment. Journal of Economic Theory,
125:189–193, 2005.
28
[15] A. Hylland and R. Zeckhauser. The efficient allocation of individuals to positions.
Journal of Political Economy, 87:293–314, 1979.
[16] P. Jaramillo and V. Manjunath. The difference indifference makes in strategy–proof
allocation of objects. Journal of Economic Theory, 147:1913–1946, 2012.
[17] K. Keizer, M. de Klerk, B. Haase-Kromwijk, and W. Weimar. The dutch algorithm
for allocation in living donor kidney exchange. Transplantation Proceedings, 37:589–
591, 2005.
[18] J. Ma. Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities. Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory, 23:75–83, 1994.
[19] E. Miyagawa. Strategy-proofness and the core in house allocation problems. Games
and Economic Behavior, 38(2):347 – 361, 2002.
[20] NHS Blood and Transplant. National matching scheme for paired and pooled (kid-
ney) donation, 2009. http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk
[21] A. Nicolo` and C. Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez. Transplant quality and patients’ preferences in
paired kidney exchange. Games and Economic Behavior, 74(1):299–310, 2012.
[22] C. M. Øien, A. V. Reisæter, T. Leivestad, F. W. Dekker, P. D. Line, and I. Os.
Living donor kidney transplantation: The effects of donor age and gender on short-
and long-term outcomes. Transplantation, 83(5):600 – 606, 2007.
[23] G. Opelz. Impact of HLA compatibility on survival of kidney transplants from un-
related live donors. Transplantation, 64:1473–1475, 1997.
[24] G. Opelz for the Collaborative Transplant Study. Hla compatibility and kidney
grafts transplants from unrelated live donors. Transplantation Proceedings, 30:704–
705, 1998.
[25] Organizacio´n Nacional de Transplantes. Programa nacional de donacio´n renal
cruzada en Espan˜a. Technical report, Documentos de Consenso ONT, September
2009.
29
[26] S. Pa´pai. Strategy-proof single unit award rules. Social Choice and Wefare, 18(4):
785–798, 2001.
[27] K. Park, J. Lee, K. Huh, S. Kim, and Y. Kim. Exchange living-donor kidney trans-
plantation: Diminution of donor organ shortage. Transplantation Proceedings, 36:
2949–2951, 2004.
[28] M. A. Rees, J. E. Kopke, R. P. Pelletier, D. L. Segev, M. E. Rutter, A. J. Fabrega,
J. Rogers, O. G. Pankewycz, J. Hiller, A. E. Roth, T. Sandholm, M. U. U¨nver, and
R. A. Montgomery. A nonsimultaneous, extended, altruistic–donor chain. The New
England Journal of Medicine, 360:1096–1101, 2009.
[29] A. E. Roth. Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods. Economics
Letters, 9:127–132, 1982.
[30] A. E. Roth, T. So¨nmez, and M. U. U¨nver. Kidney exchange. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 119:457–488, 2004.
[31] A. E. Roth, T. So¨nmez, and M. U. U¨nver. Pairwise kidney exchange. Journal of
Economic Theory, 125:151–188, 2005.
[32] A. E. Roth, T. So¨nmez, and M. U. U¨nver. A kidney exchange clearinghouse in New
England. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 95:376–380, 2005.
[33] A. E. Roth, T. So¨nmez, M. U. U¨nver, F. L. Delmonico, and S. L. Saidman. Utilizing
list exchange and nondirected donations through “chain” paired kidney donations.
American Journal of Transplantation, 6:2694–2705, 2006.
[34] A. E. Roth, T. So¨nmez, and M. U. U¨nver. Efficient kidney exchange: Coincidence
of wants in a markets with compatibility preferences. American Economic Review,
97–3:828–851, 2007.
[35] L. Shapley and H. Scarf. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics, 1:23–37, 1974.
[36] T. So¨nmez. Strategy-proofness and essentially single-valued cores. Econometrica, 67:
677–689, 1999.
30
[37] T. So¨nmez and M. U. U¨nver. Altruistically unbalanced kidney exchange. Unpublished
Manuscript, Boston College, 2013.
[38] X. Su, S. A. Zenios, and G. M. Chertow. Incorporating recipient choice in kidney
transplantation. Journal of the American Society of Nephrology, 15:1656–1663, 2004.
[39] L.-G. Svensson. Strategy–proof allocation of indivisible goods. Social Choice and
Welfare, 16(4):557–567, 1999.
[40] M.U. U¨nver. Dynamic kidney exchange. Review of Economic Studies, 77:372–414,
2010.
[41] O¨. Yılmaz. Kidney exchange: An egalitarian mechanism. Journal of Economic
Theory, 146:592–618, 2011.
[42] O¨. Yılmaz. Kidney exchange: Further utilization of donors via listed exchange.
Forthcoming Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2013.
[43] S. A. Zenios. Optimal control of a paired-kidney exchange program. Management
Science, 48:328–342, 2002.
31
Appendices. NOT FOR PUBLICATION
A Omitted Proofs
We start by providing precise statements of complementary results that are mentioned in
the text.
Theorem 5. Let Π = {Π(1), . . . ,Π(m)} be an age structure with m ≥ 2. For each k ∈ N
such that 3 ≤ k ≤ n−2, no rule ϕ : DΠ → Ak satisfies individual rationality, k-efficiency,
strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness.
Proof. If Π satisfies Assumption A, the result follows directly from Theorem 1 in the text.
So assume to the contrary that Π = {Π(1),Π(2)} does not satisfies assumption A and
there is k (3 ≤ k ≤ n − 2), and ϕ : DΠ → Ak such that ϕ satisfies the four properties.
We have two cases:
• Case i). Π(1) = {ω1}. Let %∈ DΠ be such that D(%1) = {ω2, . . . , ωk+2}, for each
i = 2, . . . , k+1, D(%i) = {ω1, ωi+1}, D(%k+2) = {ω1, ω2}. By individual rationality,
we can on the assignment of kidneys restricted to the patients {ω1, . . . , ωk+2}. (For
the sake of simplifying notation assume that n > 5. If n = 5, the argument applies
directly by letting k + 2 = 5.) By k-efficiency, ϕ(%) ∈ Ak \ Ak−1. By construction,
we can assume without loss of generality that
ϕi(%) =

ω4 if i = 1,
ω1 if i = 2,
ωi if i ∈ {3, 4},
ωi+1 if 5 ≤ i ≤ k + 1,
ω2 if i = k + 2.
Let %′∈ DΠ be such that for each i ∈ {2} ∪ {5, . . . , k + 1}, D(%′i) = ϕi(%) and for
each j /∈ {2}∪{5, . . . , k+1}, %′j=%j. By strategy-proofness, ϕ2(%′2,%−2) %′2 ϕ2(%) .
Then, ϕ2(%′2,%−2) = ω1. By non-bossiness, ϕ(%′2,%−2) = ϕ(%). Repeating the ar-
gument with the remaining patients, ϕ(%′) = ϕ(%). Let %′′∈ DΠ be such that
for each i ∈ {3, 4}, D(%′′i ) = {ω1} and for each j /∈ {3, 4}, %′′j=%′j. By individual
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rationality, ϕ3(%′′3,%′−3) ∈ {ω1, ω3}. By strategy-proofness, ϕ3(%′) %′3 ϕ3(%′′3,%′−3) .
Thus, ϕ3(%′′3,%′−3) = ϕ3(%′) = ω3 . By non-bossiness, ϕ(%′′3,%′−3) = ϕ(%′). Repeat-
ing the argument with patient 4, ϕ(%′′) = ϕ(%′) = ϕ(%). Let %′′′∈ DΠ be such that
D(%1) = {ω5}, D(%5) = {ω1}, and for each j /∈ {1, 5}, %′′′j =%′′j . By individual ratio-
nality, ϕ1(%′′′1 ,%′′−1) ∈ {ω1, ω5}. By strategy-proofness, ϕ1(%′′′1 ,%′′−1) %′′′1 ϕ1(%′′) = ω5 .
Then ϕ1(%′′′1 ,%′′−1) = ϕ1(%′′) , and by non-bossiness, ϕ(%′′′1 ,%′′−1) = ϕ(%′′) . Fi-
nally, by individual rationality, ϕ5(%′′′) ∈ {ω1, ω5}. By strategy-proofness, ω2 =
ϕ5(%′′′1 ,%′′−1) %′′5 ϕ5(%′′′) . Then, ϕ5(%′′′) = ω5 and by individual rationality, ϕ1(%′′′) =
ω1. Let b ∈ Ak, be such that for each j /∈ {1, 5}, b = ϕj(%′′′) and b1 = ω5, b5 = ω1.
Note that for each i ∈ N , bi %′′′i ϕi(%′′′), and b1 %′′′1 ϕ1(%′′′) and b5 %′′′5 ϕ5(%′′′),
which contradicts k-efficiency.
• Case ii). Π(2) = {ωn}. Let %∈ DΠ be such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
D(%) = {ωi+1, ωn}, D(%k+1) = {ω1, ωn}, and D(%n) = {ω1, . . . , ωk+1}. By individ-
ual rationality, we can focus on the assignment of kidneys restricted to the patients
{ω1, . . . , ωk+1} ∪ {ωn}. By k-efficiency, ϕ(%) ∈ Ak \Ak−1. By construction, we can
assume without loss of generality that
ϕi(%) =

ωi+1 if i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}
ωn if i = k − 1,
ωi if i ∈ {k, k + 1},
ω1 if i = n.
Let %′∈ DΠ be such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 2}, D(%i) = ϕi(%), and for each
j ≥ k − 1, %′j=%j. By strategy-proofness, ϕ1(%′1,%−1) %′1 ϕ1(%) = ω2. Then,
ϕ1(%′1,%−1) = ϕ1(%), and by non-bossiness, ϕ(%′1,%−1) = ϕ(%). Repeating the
argument with patients i = 2, . . . , k−2, one at a time, we obtain ϕ(%′) = ϕ(%). Let
%′′∈ DΠ be such that D(%′′k) = {ωk+1}and for each j 6= k, %′′j=%′j. By individual ra-
tionality, ϕk(%′′k,%′−k) ∈ {ωk, ωk+1}. By strategy-proofness, ϕk(%′) %′k ϕk(%′′k,%′−k) .
Hence, ϕk(%′′k,%′−k) = ωk = ϕk(%′) and by non-bossiness, ϕk(%′′k,%′−k) = ϕk(%′)
and ϕ(%′′) = ϕ(%′). To conclude, let %′′′∈ DΠ be such that D(%′′′k−1) = {ωk} and
for each j 6= k − −1, %′′′j =%′′j . By individual rationality, ϕk−1 ∈ {ωk−1, ωk}. By
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k-efficiency,
ϕi(%′′′) =

ωi if i ∈ {1, 2},
ωi+1 if i ∈ {3, . . . , k},
ωn if i = k + 1,
ω3 if i = n.
Note that ϕk−1(%′′′) ′′k−1 ϕk−1(%′′) which contradicts strategy-proofness.
Weak Coalitional Strategy-Proofness. For each %∈ D, there does not exist T ⊆ N
and %′T∈ DT such that for each i ∈ T , ϕi(%′T ,%N\T ) i ϕi(%).
Theorem 6. For each age structure Π and each priority ordering σ, if σ respects Π then
the age-based priority rule ψσ satisfies weak coalitional strategy-proofness in DΠ.
Proof. In order to simplify notation, we consider the natural priority ordering σ∗. The
arguments apply directly for every arbitrary priority ordering that respects Π. Assume
to the contrary that ψ∗ violates weak coalitional strategy-proofness. Then, there exists
T ⊆ N , %∈ DΠ, %′T∈ ×i∈TDΠi such that for each i ∈ T , ψ∗i (%′T ,%N\T ) i ψ∗i (%) .
Let patient j ∈ T be such that for each k ∈ T , j ≤ k. Since j ∈ T , %j 6=%′j and
ψ∗j (%′T ,%N\T ) j ψ∗j (%) , necessarily ψ∗j (%′T ,%N\T ) 6= ψ∗j (%) . There are two possibilities:
Case i). For each i < j, ψ∗i (%′T ,%N\T ) = ψ∗i (%) and for some patient k, ωk = ψ∗j (%′T ,%N\T ) .
By the definition of ψ∗, ωj ∈ D(%′k)\D(%k) and ωk k ωj. Because %k 6=%′k, k ∈ T .
However, by ψ∗’s individual rationality, ψ∗k(%) %k ωk k ωj = ψ∗k(%′T ,%N\T ) , which
contradicts k ∈ T .
Case ii). There exists i < j such that ψ∗i (%′T ,%N\T ) 6= ψ∗i (%) . Let i′ < j be such
that for each i < i′ ψ∗i (%′T ,%N\T ) = ψ∗i (%) . If ψ∗i′(%′T ,%N\T ) i′ ψ∗i′(%) , by the
definition of age based priority rule, there exists k ∈ T such that ωi′ /∈ D(%k) and
ωi′ ∈ D(%′k) and ψ∗i′(%′T ,%N\T ) = ωk . However, by individual rationality, ψ∗k(%) %k
ωk k ωi′ = ψ∗k(%′T ,%N\T ), which contradicts k ∈ T . Finally, if ψ∗i′(%) %i′ ψ∗i′(%′T ,%N\T ) ,
then there exists k′ ∈ T such that ψ∗i′(%) = ωk′ . By the definitions of ψ∗ and i′,
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ωi′ ∈ D(%k′) \D(%′k′) , and for each %k′∈ DΠ, ωi′ = ψ∗k′(%) %k′ ψ∗k′(%′T ,%N\T ) ,
which contradicts k ∈ T .
Because both cases exhaust all the possibilities, this suffices to prove weak coalitional
strategy-proofness.
B Generalized Π Based Preferences
Let C = {Π1, . . . ,ΠS} denote a collection of partitions of Ω. For each s ∈ {1, . . . , S},
Πs = {Πs(1), . . . ,Πs(ms)} is partition of Ω according to characteristic s. We write
ω >s ω′ if and only if ω ∈ Πs(l) and ω′ ∈ Πs(l′) with m′ > m. We write ω′ ≥C ω if and
only if for all s ≤ S, ω ≥s ω′ and ∃ s′ ≤ S such that ω >s′ ω′. We write ω′ =C ω if and
only if for each s ≤ S and ls ≤ ms, ω ∈ Πs(ls) implies ω′ ∈ Πs(ls).
For each patient i ∈ N , the preference relation %i∈ P is a generalized C-based
preference if for each ω, ω′ ∈ D(%i) and for each ω¯ ∈ ND(%i):
1. if ω′≥Cω then ω i ω′;
2. if ω′=Cω then ω ∼i ω′.
3. ωi i ω¯.
Let DCi denote the set of all C-based preferences for patient i and let DC ≡ ×i∈NDCi .
According to C-based preferences, for each characteristic s (age, health status, etc.)
Πs partitions (in decreasing order) the set of available kidneys in subsets of kidneys which
are homogeneous according to characteristic s. Thus, if Π1 is the partition of available
kidneys generated according to the characteristic s = 1 , say age, Π1(1) contains the
youngest (and therefore best according to this characteristic) kidneys, Π1(2) the second
youngest kidneys, and Π1(m1) the oldest kidneys. Condition 1 says that for each patient
i, if a compatible kidney ω is better ranked than kidney ω′ according to one characteristic
and no worst according to each other characteristic, then kidney ω is preferred to the
latter ω′. Condition 2 says that for each patient i if a kidney ω belongs the the same
group as another kidney ω′ according to each characteristic s, then the two kidneys are
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indifferent for patient i. The last Condition 3 simply says that for each patient i, every
desirable kidney is strictly preferred to every undesirable kidney.
The three conditions do not impose any constraint for each pair of compatible kidneys
ω, ω˜ such that there exist two characteristics s, s′ with ω >s ω˜ and ω <s
′
ω˜. According
to a generalized C-based preference relation , even if patients agree on how to rank
every kidney according to each characteristic, they may not agree on the relevance of
the different characteristics for the overall evaluation of the kidnyes. Even if all patients
prefer ceteris paribus, a younger kidney to an older one, a patient may prefer a younger
kidney from a diabetic donor to an older kidney from an healthier donor while another
patient may prefer the latter kidney to the former one. It is straightforward to note that
if S = 1, then the generalized C-based preference and our original Πage based preference
coincide.
We consider the above preference domain a natural generalization in an ordinal frame-
work of the age based preference domain. Unfortunately, the next proposition proves that
if there are more than one relevant characteristic and at least two pairs of kidneys that
are ranked differently according to two characteristics, then there is no rule satisfying
individual rationality, k-efficiency, and strategy-proofness.
Assumption B. For each collection of partitions C = {Π1, . . . ,ΠS} with #S ≥ 2, there
are s, s′ ≤ S and i, i′, i′′ ∈ N such that Πs ≥ 3, ωi >s ωi′ >s ωi′′ , and ωi′′ >s′ ωi.
Proposition 3. Let C = {Π1, . . . ,ΠS} be a collection of partitions that satisfies Assump-
tion B. For each 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, there is no rule ϕ : DC → Ak such that ϕ satisfies
individual rationality, k-efficiency, and strategy-proofness.
Proof. Since Assumption B implies Assumption A, by Theorem 1, we have only to prove
that no pairwise exchange rule satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency, and strategy-
proofness. Without loss of generality, we focus on N = {1, 2, 3} (by individual rationality,
assume all other patients are incompatible with these three patients). Let the collection
of partitions C be such that there are partitions Πs,Πs′ ∈ C such that ω1 >s ω2 >s ω3
and ωs
′
3 > ω1. Let %∈ DC be such that for each patient i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and D(%i) = {ωj |
j ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {i}}, ω2 1 ω3, ω3 2 ω1, and ω1 3 ω2. To interpret this preference profile
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assume for instance that patients 1 and 3 care more about characteristic s than about
characteristic s′, patient 2 cares more about the characteristic s′ than about caracteristic
s, and patient 3 cares about characteristic s. The proof follows immediately applying the
first part of the proof of Theorem 1 in Nicolo` and Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez [21].
C Public Information about Compatibility
In this section we briefly discuss the alternative framework in which compatibilities among
donors and patients are public information. For each patient i let Ci ⊆ Ω be i’s set of
compatible kidneys. That is, the kidneys that according to the medical test carried by
the transplant coordinator will not rejected by i’s immune system and that may result
in a successful transplantation. Let C ≡ {Ci}i∈N ∈ Ωn denote a compatibility profile .
If the patients are allowed to refuse any compatible kidney, we could define the sets of
desirable (and undesirable kidneys) just as those compatible kidneys that are preferred
to each patient’s donor kidney. With such definition, all our previous results would
immediately follow.23 When the compatibility information is publicly observable, however,
the arbitrary refusal of compatible kidneys does not seem adequate in the age-based
environment. Following Nicolo` and Rodr´ıguez-A´lvarez [21], it seems reasonable to assume
that whenever a patient considers a compatible kidney as desirable, then she also considers
all the compatible kidneys from younger donors as desirable. In this framework, the only
relevant information that remains private is the minimal quality (maximal age) that a
patient requires to undergo transplantation. This observation leads to an additional
restriction of patients’ preferences.
Let Π = {Π(1), . . . ,Π(m)} be an age structure and C a compatibility profile.
The preference relation %i∈ P is a Π age based preference consistent with C if
(i) for each ω ∈ D(%i) with ω ∈ Π(m), and for each ω′ ∈ Ci\{ωi} such that ω′ ∈ Π(m′)
and m′ ≤ m, ω′ ∈ D(%i).
23Arbitrary refusals may be originated by any kind of preconception, or they may incorporate at some
extent the preferences of the donor. For instance, the donor may accept the non-related living donation,
if no long travels are required.
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(ii) ωi ∈ Ci and ωi ∈ Π(j) imply that for each ω′ ∈ Π(j′) with j < j′, ω′ ∈ ND(%i).
(iii) for each ω, ω′ ∈ D(%i), ω ∈ Π(j) and ω′ ∈ Π(k), ω %i ω′ if and only if j ≤ k.
(iv) for each ω¯, ω¯′ ∈ ND(%i), ωi i ω¯ and ω¯ ∼i ω¯′.
We denote by DΠi (C) the domain of Π age based preferences consistent with C for patient
i and DΠ(C) ≡ ×iDΠi (C).
If C is public information, the ranking of desirable kidneys is determined by Π, and
each patient’s set of desirable kidneys depends both on Π and C . By (i), if a compatible
kidney is desirable for patient i, then all the compatible kidneys from a donor with lower
(or equal) age are also desirable. By (ii), if patient i’s donor is compatible with patient i,
then the kidneys from compatible donors older than patient i’s donor are not desirable.
Items (iii) and (iv) just reproduce the notions of age-based preferences presented in
section 3. This preference domain is similar to the domain proposed by Bogomolnaia and
Moulin [6] in a problem of random house allocation. These authors assume that there is
a common (strict) ranking of objects but there is no restriction on how each agent ranks
her outside option (not receiving any object) with respect to the available objects.
Note that if the information about compatibility is public, the only information about
each patient’s preference that remains private is the older compatible kidney that she
is willing to receive. Note that our definition incorporates the possibility of altruistic
motivations. A patient may have a compatible donor, but she may prefer to receive
compatible kidneys that belong to the same element of the age structure Π. (See So¨nmez
and U¨nver [37].) Alternatively, if she prefers her donor’s kidney to compatible kidneys in
the same element of the partition, the patient accepts an exchange only if she improves
upon her donor’s kidney. For each patient i, each age structure Π, and each C, DΠi (C) ⊂
DΠi . On the other hand, the transplant coordinator may use the information in C in the
definition of the rule. Hence, we deal with C specific rules, ϕC : DΠ(C)→ Ak. With the
introduction of new notation, we can now state new versions of our results for specific C.
Theorem 7. For each age structure Π, each k ∈ N such that 3 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, there are
C no rule ϕC : DΠ(C) → Ak satisfies individual rationality, k-efficiency, and strategy-
proofness.
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Proof. The arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 apply directly. For each patient i, let
Ci = {ωi+1, ωi+2} (modulo n). Note that all the preferences we used in the proof of
Theorem 1 belong to DΠ(C).
Since for each C, DΠi (C) ⊂ DΠi , Proposition 1 applies and under the age structure Π∗,
the age–based priority rule always selects the unique core-stable assignment.
Theorem 8. For each C, a rule ϕC : DΠ∗(C) → A2 satisfies individual rationality,
2-efficiency and strategy-proofness if and only if ϕC is the age-based priority rule ψ∗.
Proof. The arguments in the proof of Theorem 2 apply directly once we observe that the
domain DΠ∗(C) satisfies So¨nmez [36]’s conditions.
With Theorem 8 at hand and with the fact that DΠi (C) ⊂ DΠi , we obtain the following
result.
Theorem 9. For each age structure Π, each priority ordering σ, the priority rule ψσ
satisfies strategy-proofness in DΠ(C) for each C if and only if ψσ is an age-based priority
rule.
Proof. Consider an age structure Π and a priority ordering σ that does not respect Π.
Hence, by Remark 2, there are i, j,m ∈ N , k, k′ ∈ N be such that ωi ∈ Π(k), ωj ∈ Π(k′),
k ≤ k′, σ(i) > σ(j), and σm > σj. Let C and %∈ DΠ be such that Ci = D(%i) = {ωm},
Cj = D(%j) = {ωm} , and Cm = D(%m) = {ωi, ωj} . Clearly, ψσm(%) = ωj. Let %′m∈ DΠm
be such that D(%′m) = {ωi} . Then, ψσm(%′m,%−m) = ωi , and ψσm(%′m,%−m) m ψσm(%) ,
which proves that ψσ violates strategy-proofness. Since DΠ(C) ⊂ DΠ, the arguments in
the proof of Theorem 3 prove that every age-based priority rule satisfies strategy-proofness
in DΠ(C).
We conclude with the generalization of Lemma 1 and Example 1 to the new environ-
ment.
Lemma 3. There are C such that if ϕC : DΠ(C)→ A2 satisfies individual rationality, 2-
efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness, then for each i, j ∈ N and %∈ DΠ(C),
ωi ∈ D(%j) and ωj ∈ D(%i) either ϕCi (%) %i ωj or ϕCj (%) %j ωi (or both).
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Proof. Assume there are C˜, an age structure Π, and ϕC˜ : DΠ(C˜) that satisfies indi-
vidual rationality, 2-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness. Take i, j ∈ N and
%˜ ∈ DΠ(C˜) such that ωi ∈ D(%˜j) and ωj ∈ D(%˜i) but ωi˜jϕC˜j (%˜) and ωj˜iϕC˜i (%˜).
Define C in such a way that Ci = {ωj, ϕC˜i (%˜)}, Cj = {ωi, ϕC˜j (%˜)}, and for each
k ∈ N \ {i, j}, Ck = ϕC˜k (%˜). From now on, the proof literally replicates the argu-
ments in the proof of Lemma 1. Assume to the contrary that there are ϕC : DΠ(C) →
A2 and %∈ DΠ(C) such that ωi ∈ D(%j) and ωj ∈ D(%i) but ωi j ϕCj (%) and
ωj i ϕCi (%). Let %′∈ DΠ(C) be such that %′i=%i, %′j=%j, and for each k ∈ N \
{i, j}, D(%′k) = {ϕCk (%)}. Let k′ ∈ N \ {i, j}. By individual rationality, ϕCk′(%′k′
,%−k′) ∈ {ωk′ , ϕCk′(%)}. By strategy-proofness, ϕCk′(%′k′ ,%−k′) %′k′ ϕCk′(%) . Hence, ϕCk′(%′k′
,%−k′) = ϕCk′(%), and by non-bossiness, ϕC(%′k′ ,%−k′) = ϕC(%) . Repeating the argu-
ment with the remaining patients (one at a time), we obtain ϕC(%′) = ϕC(%) . Let
%′′∈ DΠ(C) be such that D(%′′i ) = {ωj, ϕCi (%)} , D(%′′j ) = {ωi, ϕCj (%)} and for each pa-
tient k /∈ {i, j}, %′′k=%′k. By individual rationality and strategy-proofness, ϕCi (%′′i ,%′−i
) = ϕCi (%′). By non-bossiness, ϕC(%′′i ,%′−i) = ϕC(%′). Similarly, by individual ra-
tionality and strategy-proofness, ϕCj (%′′{i,j},%′−{i,j}) = ϕCj (%′′i ,%′−i). By non-bossiness,
ϕC(%′′{i,j},%′−{i,j}) = ϕC(%′′i ,%′−i). Thus, ϕC(%′′) = ϕC(%′) . Let %¯ ∈ DΠ(C) be such
that D(%¯i) = {ωj}, D(%¯j) = {ωi}, and for each patient k /∈ {i, j}, %¯k =%′′k. By indi-
vidual rationality and strategy-proofness, ϕCi (%¯i,%′′−i) = {ωi} . By individual rationality,
ϕCj (%¯i,%′′−i) ∈ {ωj, ϕCj (%′′)} . By 2-efficiency, ϕCj
(
%¯i,%′′−i
)
= ϕCj (%′′). Finally, by indi-
vidual rationality and strategy-proofness, ϕCj (%¯{i,j},%′′−{i,j}) = {ωj} and ϕCi (%¯{i,j},%′−{i,j}) = {ωi} ,
which violates 2-efficiency.
Example 2. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, Π(1) = {ω1, ω2}, Π(2) = {ω3, ω4}, and C such that:
C1 = {ω2, ω3, ω4}, C3 = {ω1},
C2 = {ω1, ω3, ω4}, C4 = {ω2}.
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Consider the preference profile %∈ DΠ such that
%1 %2 %3 %4
ω2 ω1 ω1 ω2
ω3 ∼1 ω4 ω3 ∼1 ω4 ω3 ω4
ω1 ω2 . . . . . .
Note that (ω3, ω4, ω1, ω2) ∈ I(%). Replicating the arguments in the proofs of Lemmata 1
and 3, we obtain that for every rule ϕC : DΠ(C)→ A2 that satisfies individual rationality,
2-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness,
ϕC(%) = (ω2, ω1, ω3, ω4).
Corollary 1. There exists C such that if a rule ϕC satisfies individual rationality, 2-
efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness, then for some preference profile %∈
DΠ(C), ϕC(%) does not maximize the number of mutually compatible kidney exchanges.
D Multiple Donors
Sometimes patients in the waiting list may find more than one potential donor. If patients
with multiple potential donors are keen to participate in PKE programs, algorithms have
to take account of this aspect. Even if only one among the potential donors of a patient
donates her kidney, the fact that a patient may have many potential donors can greatly
increase the chances to find mutually compatible pairs. Since it is reasonable to assume
that the information about how many potential donors a patient has is private information,
rules should provide them incentives to reveal this valuable information. To analyze this
general case, we need to slightly modify the framework and to incorporate some additional
notation.
Let N = {i, . . . , n} be a set of patients and Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωn′} be a set of available
kidneys from living donors, n ≤ n′.24 For each patient i let Ωi denote the set of kidneys
from i’s donors. Clearly, ∪i∈nΩi = Ω and for each patient j 6= i, Ωi ∩ Ωj = ∅. Let the
mapping ρ : N→ N be such that for each j ≤ n ρ(j) = i if ωj ∈ Ωi.
24Note that, from now on, kidneys’ indexes do not refer to patients.
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In the multiple donor case, we analyze patients’ incentives to manipulate by report-
ing different sets of potential donors. The set of donors is an argument of the kidney
assingment rule. For each patient i let Ki be the set of non-empty subsets of Ωi and
Ki ∈ Ki be a set of donors that may be reported by patient i to the PKE program cor-
dinator. Let K ≡ ×i∈NKi. We denote by K = (K1, . . . , Kn) a generic element of K. Let
Ω = (Ω1, . . . ,Ωn). For each K = (K1, . . . , Kn) ∈ K and for each S ⊆ N , KS denotes the
restriction of K to the members of S, and for each %∈ P , %K is the restriction of % to
the kidneys ∪i∈NKi.
A (generalized) assignment a is an n-vector a = (a1, . . . , an), such that for each
patient i ai ∈ Ω and
(i) for each i, j ∈ N , i 6= j and each ω, ω′ ∈ Ω, if ai = ω, aj = ω′, then ω 6= ω′;
(ii) for each i ∈ N , if for some j ∈ N , aj ∈ Ωi, then for every j′ 6= j, aj′ /∈ Ωi.
We introduced this second requirement to convey the idea that for each patient at most
one donor donates her kidney.
For each K ∈ K, we say that a generalized assignment a is feasible under the set
of donors K if for each i, j ∈ N , ai ∈ Ωj implies ai ∈ Kj. Let A(K) be the set of all
feasible (generalized) assignments under K, and for each k ≤ n let Ak(K) be the set of
all (generalized) assignments with cardinality smaller than or equal to k that are feasible
under K.
A generalized (kidney assignment) rule is a mapping Φ : D×K → A such that
for each %∈ D and each K ∈ K, Φ(%,K) ∈ A(K) and for each %,%′∈ D and K ∈ K
such that %K=%′K, Φ(%,K) = Φ(%′,K).
For each K ∈ K, the definitions of k-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness
directly apply to the multiple donors scenario. Individual rationality may be immediately
extended just by applying its logic to all the potential donors of each patient.
Individual Rationality for generalized rules. For each i ∈ N , each %∈ D, each
K ∈ K, and each ω ∈ Ki, Φi(%,K) %i ω.
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In the multiple donors scenario, we assume that patients only care about the kidney
they receive and do not have preferences over who will be the donor involved in the kidney
exchange. Patients’ preferences are still defined over all potential donors Ω. To conclude
with the description of patients’ preferences, we say that a kidney is desirable for patient i
if it improves upon i’s all potential donors’ kidneys. That is, for each patient i, i’s set of
desirable kidneys is the set D(%i) ≡ {ω ∈ Ω | ∀ω′ ∈ Ωi, ω i ω′} . With this definition
of desirable kidneys, for each age structure Π = {Π(1), . . . ,Π(m)} of Ω, the notion of age
based preferences in the multiple donors scenario simply replicates the definition in the
single donor case. In order to save notation, we assume that for each Π and each %i∈ DΠ
there is a unique kidney in Ωi, ω¯(i,%i) = {ω ∈ Ωi | for each ω′ ∈ Ωi, ω %i ω′}.
Since the single donor framework is a special case of the multiple donors scenario,
many important results of the single donor framework immediately extend to the multiple
donors framework. Specifically, with the same arguments we use in the single donor case
we obtain the following versions of Theorem 1, Lemma 1, and Theorem 4.
Theorem 10. For each age structure Π, each K ∈ K, and each k ∈ N such that 3 ≤ k ≤
n− 1, no generalized rule Φ : DΠ ×K → Ak satisfies individual rationality, k-efficiency,
and strategy-proofness.
Lemma 4. For each K ∈ K, if Φ : DΠ × K → A2 satisfies individual rationality, 2-
efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness, then for each i, j ∈ N , %∈ DΠ, ωi ∈
D(%j) and ωj ∈ D(%i) imply either Φi(%,K) %i ωj or ϕj(%,K) %j ωi (or both).
Theorem 11. For each K ∈ K, if Φ : DΠ × K → A2 satisfies individual rational-
ity, 2-efficiency, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness, then ϕ is a sequential matching
maximizing rule.
However, we need to adopt the definition of age–based priority rules to the multiple
donors case. Since patients may have donors whose kidneys belong to different classes
of the age structure Π, the extension of a the notion of age-based priority rules to the
multiple donors case is not immediate. We devote this appendix to show the difficulties
that arise in this setting and how to tailor age-based priority rules in order to preserve
the properties that they satisfy in the single-donor scenario.
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Example 3. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, Ω = {ω1, . . . , ω5}, Π = {Π(1),Π(2)} such that Π(1) =
{ω1, ω2}, Π(2) = {ω3, ω4, ω5} and Ω1 = {ω1, ω4}, Ω2 = {ω2} and Ω3 = {ω3, ω5}. Let the
generalized rule Φ be defined in such a way that, for each K ∈ K, Φ(· ,K) is a priority rule
with priority ordering σ∗. The rule Φ assigns priority to patients with a donor in Π(1).
Let %∈ DΠ be such that D(%1) = {ω3}, D(%2) = {ω5} and D(%3) = {ω2, ω4}. Let K be
such that K = Ω. Let %′∈ DΠ be such that %′j=%j for j = 1, 2, and let D(%′3) = {ω2}.
Clearly, Φ(%,K) = (ω3, ω2, ω4) Φ(%′,K) = (ω1, ω5, ω2), and Φ3(%′,K) 3 Φ(%,K).
Thus, Φ violates strategy-proofness.
With multiple donors, it is necessary to define a multi-stage mechanism in order to
maintain the non-manipulability of the age-based priority rule. At a first glance, Theorem
11 suggests that patients with young donors should have the right to choose first in the
priority sequential procedure. It is not immediate, however, how to assign the priorities
when patients may simultaneously have young and mature donors. To preserve strategy-
proofness, it is necessary that younger kidneys are offered first.
Let us define the generalized priority algorithm based on natural order of the kidneys.
For each %∈ P and each K ∈ K, let
GM0(%,K) = I(%,K),
Next, for each k = 1, . . . , n′, define iteratively
Sk(%,K) =
 b ∈ GMk−1(%,K) either bρ(k) = ω¯(ρ(k),%ρ(k))or bρ(k) ∈ Ωj ⇒ bj ∈ {ω1, . . . , ωk} ∩ Ωρ(k)

and
GMk(%,K) =
{
a ∈ GMk−1(%,K) | for each b ∈ Sk(%,K), aρ(k) %ρ(k) bρ(k)
}
.
For each K ∈ K the generalized priority algorithm selects sequentially from the set of
individually rational pairwise assignments. At stage 1, patient ρ(1) considers the assign-
ments in I(%,K) that involve either not exchanging any kidney or exchanging kidney
ω1, this is the set S1(%,K). Then, only those assignment in I(%,K) that are at least as
preferred as any assignment in S1(%,K) are selected to continue in the second stage. In a
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nutshell, ρ(1) leaves to the second stage those assignments that are at least as good as the
best outcome ρ(1) may obtain by exchanging ω1. At stage k, ρ(k) leaves to stage k + 1
those assignments that are as good or improve upon the assignments ρ(k) may obtain
exchanging any ω′ ∈ {ω1, . . . , ωk}∩Ωρ(k). Note that if ωk ∈ Ωi and there is no k′ ≥ k such
that ωk′ ∈ Ωi, ρ(k) = i and for each a, a′ ∈ GMk(%,K), ai ∼i a′i. Hence, GMσn′(%,K) is
well defined, non-empty, and essentially single-valued.25
A pairwise exchange rule Ψ : D → A2 is a generalized age based priority rule if
for each %∈ DΠ and each K, Ψ(%,K) ∈ GMn′(%).
We focus first in the case of strict preferences over desirable kidneys. Hence, consider
Π∗ = {Π∗(1), . . . ,Π∗(n′)}, with Π∗(l) = {ωl} for each l = 1, . . . , n′.
Proposition 4. For each %∈ DΠ∗, and each K ∈ K, C(%,K) = {Ψ(%,K)}.
Proof. Let %∈ DΠ∗ . We first prove that for each b ∈ A2 \ Ψ(%,K), b /∈ C(%,K) . If b /∈
I(%,K), then clearly b /∈ C(%). Let b ∈ I(%,K). Let ωi be the kidney such that bρ(i) 6=
Ψρ(i)(%,K) and for each i′ ∈ N with i′ < i, bρ(i′) = Ψρ(i′)(%,K). Let ωj be the kidney such
that Ψρ(i)(%,K) = ωj. Note that since b ∈ I(%,K) and preferences over desirable kidneys
are strict, by the definitions of Ψ and i, we have i < j and Ψρ(i)(%,K) = ωj ρ(i) bρ(i).
Because Ψρ(j)(%,K) = ωi ∈ D(%ρ(j)), for each i′ ∈ N such that ωi′ ρ(j) ωi, i′ < i. Thus,
since for each i′ < i, Ψρ(i′)(%,K) = bρ(i′) 6= ωj, we have Ψρ(j)(%,K) = ωi ρ(j) bρ(j).
Hence, the pair {ρ(i), ρ(j)} weakly blocks b at % via Ψ(%, ,K).
To conclude the proof, we show that Ψ(%,K) ∈ C(%,K). Since Ψ(%,K) ∈ I(%,K),
there is no single-patient coalition that weakly blocks Ψ(%,K) at %. Hence, we check
that Ψ(%,K) is not weakly blocked by a pair of patients. Assume to the contrary that
there are a pair {ωi, ωj} ⊂ Ω and a ∈ A2 such that {ρ(i), ρ(j)} weakly block Ψ(%,K) at
% via a. Without loss of generality, let i < j. Since preferences over desirable kidneys are
strict and a 6= Ψ(%,K), aρ(i) = ωj ρ(i) Ψρ(i)(%,K) and aρ(j) = ωi ρ(j) Ψρ(j)(%,K). Let
ωj′ be the kidney such that Ψρ(i)(%,K) = ωj′ . There are two cases:
Case i). j′ < i. Because %ρ(i)∈ DΠ∗ρ(i) and j′ < i < j, ωj′ ρ(i) ωj = aρ(i), which
contradicts {ρ(i), ρ(j)} weakly blocking Ψ(%,K) via a.
25Moreover, if for each i ∈ N , #Ωi = 1, and K = (K1, . . . ,Kn) = (ω1, . . . , ωn), GMσn(%,K) =Mn(%).
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Case ii) i ≤ j′. Since i < j and ωj ∈ D(%ρ(i)) and ωj ρ(i) ωj′ = Ψρ(i)(%,K),
by the definition of Ψ, either ωρ(i) /∈ D(%ρ(j)) or there is i′ with i′ < i, such that
Ψρ(j)(%,K) = ωi′ . In either case, Ψρ(j)(%,K) ρ(j) ωi, which contradicts {ρ(i), ρ(j)}
weakly blocking Ψ(%,K) via a.
Since both cases are exhaustive, Ψ(%,K) ∈ C(%,K), and by the arguments in the previous
paragraph, C(%,K) = {Ψ(%,K)}.
With Proposition 4 at hand, we characterize the generaliazed age based priority rule
Ψ as the unique generalized pairwise exchange rule that satisfies individual rationality,
2-efficiency, and strategy-proofness in DΠ
∗
.
Theorem 12. A generalized rule Φ : DΠ∗ × K → A2 satisfies individual rationality,
2-efficiency and strategy-proofness if and only if Φ is the generalized age based priority
rule Ψ.
Proof. The generalized age based priority rule Ψ satisfies individual rationality by its very
definition of Ψ. Assume that Ψ does not satisfy 2-efficiency, then there are %∈ DΠ and
a ∈ A2 such that for each i ∈ N , ai %i Ψi(%,K), and for some i′ ∈ N , ai′ i′ Ψi′(%,K).
Let k be such that aρ(k) ρ(k) Ψρ(k)(%,K). Note that aρ(k) = ωk′ 6= ω¯(ρ(k),%ρ(k)),
and aρ(k′) 6= Ψρ(k′)(%,K) , and since ai %i Ψ(%,K) and preferences over desirable kid-
neys are strict, aρ(k′) ρ(k′) Ψρ(k′)(%,K) . Thus, {ρ(i), ρ(j)} weakly block Ψ(%,K) at
% via a, which contradicts Proposition 4, since Ψ(%,K) ∈ C(%,K). We conclude
showing that Ψ satisfies strategy-proofness. Let i ∈ N , %∈ DΠ∗ and %′i∈ DΠ∗i . As-
sume first that, ψ∗i (%) = ψ∗i (%′i,%−i) , then ψ∗i (%) %i ψ∗i (%′i,%−i). Assume now that
ψ∗i (%) 6= ψ∗i (%′i,%−i) . Let j, j′ ∈ N be such that Ψi(%) = ωj and Ψ(%′i,%−i) = ωj′ .
There are two cases:
Case i). ωj = ω¯(i,%i). By the definition of Ψ, ωj′ ∈ D(%′i) \ D(%i), and Ψi(%) %i
Ψi(%′i,%−i).
Case ii). ωj 6= ω¯(i,%i). By the definition of Ψ(%), ωj ∈ D(%i) and therefore ωj i
ω¯(i,%i). Since Ψi(%) 6= Ψi(%′i,%−i), then either j′ < j with ωj′ ∈ D(%′i) \D(%i),
or j < j′, or ωj′ ∈ Ωi. In either case Ψi(%) %i Ψi(%′i,%−i).
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Since both cases are exhaustive, ψ∗ satisfies strategy-proofness.
The proof of necessity follows from the same arguments of the proof of Theorem 2
in the text, since the multiple donors framework satisfies the conditions of Theorem 1 in
So¨nmez [36].
Next we check that generalized age based priority rules satisfy the properties we are
interested in for arbitrary age structures.
Proposition 5. Let Π be an arbitrary age structure. The generalized age based priority
rule Ψ : DΠ×K → A2 satisfies individual rationality, 2-efficiency and strategy-proofness.
Proof. By definition, Ψ satisfies individual rationality.
2–efficiency. Let %∈ DΠ and K ∈ K. Assume to the contrary that Ψ does not satisfy
2-efficiency. Then there is a ∈ A2(K) such that ai %i Ψi(%,K) for each i ∈ N
and there is j such that aj %j Ψj(%,K). Note that since Ψ satisfies individual
rationality, a ∈ I(%,K). Let k ≤ n′ be such that ρ(k) = j and such that for
each GMk(%,K) ⊆ Sk(%,K). That is, Ψj(%,K) ∈ Sk(%,K) and there is no
b ∈ GMk−1(%,K) such that bj j Ψj(%,K). Hence a /∈ GMk−1(%,K), and there
is j′ and k′ ≤ k such that ρ(k′) = j and for each a′ ∈ GMk−1(%,K), a′j′ j′ aj′ .
Since Ψ(%,K) ∈ GMk−1(%,K), Ψj′(%,K) j′ aj′ , a contradiction.
Strategy-proofness . Let i ∈ N , %∈ DΠ∗ and%′i∈ DΠ∗i . Assume first that, ψ∗i (%) = ψ∗i (%′i,%−i) ,
then ψ∗i (%) %i ψ∗i (%′i,%−i). Assume now that ψ∗i (%) 6= ψ∗i (%′i,%−i) . Let j, j′ ∈ N
be such that Ψi(%) = ωj and Ψ(%′i,%−i) = ωj′ . There are two cases:
Case i). ωj = ω¯(i,%i). By the definition of Ψ, ωj′ ∈ D(%′i)\D(%i), and Ψi(%) %i
Ψi(%′i,%−i) .
Case ii). ωj 6= ω¯(i,%i). Let l, l′ be such that j ∈ Π(l), j′ ∈ Π(l′). By the definition
of Ψ(%), ωj ∈ D(%i) and therefore ωj i ω¯(i,%i). Since Ψi(%) 6= Ψi(%′i,%−i),
then either l′ < l and ωj′ ∈ D(%′i) \D(%i), or l ≤ l′, or ωj′ ∈ Ωi. In either case
Ψi(%) %i Ψi(%′i,%−i).
Since both cases are exhaustive, ψ∗ satisfies strategy-proofness.
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Since the set of donors of each patient may be private information, we introduce a
non-manipulability property that takes into account patients’ incentives to manipulate
the PKE outcome by withholding their potential donors as well as misreporting their
preferences.
Example 4. Consider N , %, and K as defined in Example 3. Let K ′j = Ωj for j ∈ {1, 2}
and K ′3 = {ω5}. Note that
Φ(%,K) = (ω3, ω2, ω4) and Φ(%,K′) = (ω1, ω5, ω2).
Hence, Φ3 (%,K′) 3 Φ3(%,K) .
The next theorem, shows that the generalized age based priority rule Ψ is immune to
manipulations of groups of patients by withholding part of their donors.
Extended Weakly Coalitional Strategy-Proofness (EWCSP). There are no T ⊆
N , %∈ D, %′T∈ DT , and K′T ∈ ×i∈TKi, such that for each i ∈ T ,
Φi(%′T ,%N\T , (K′T ,ΩN\T )) i Φi(%,Ω) .
Theorem 13. The generalized age-based priority rule Ψ : DΠ × K → A2 satisfies
EWCSP.
Proof. For each %∈ DΠ, and each K′ ∈ K such that for each patient i, K ′i ⊂ Ωi, because
I(%,K′) ⊆ I(%,Ω), by the iterative definition of Ψ, for every patient i, Ψi(%,Ω) %i
Ψ(%,K′) . Then, for each T ⊆ N , each %∈ DΠ, each K′T ∈ ×i∈TKi, for each i ∈ T :
Ψi(%,Ω) %i Ψi(%, (ΩN\T ,K′T )). (1)
Let K ∈ K. We next show that for each %∈ DΠ and each T ⊆ N , there is no %′T∈ DΠT such
that for each i ∈ T , Ψi(%′T ,%N\T ) i Ψi(%).Assume to the contrary that there exist %∈
DΠ, T ⊆ N ,, and %′T∈ ×i∈TDΠi such that for each i ∈ T , Ψi(%′T ,%N\T ,K) i Ψi(%,K) .
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Let kidney j ≤ n′ be such that for each ρ(j) ∈ T , and for each k < j, either ρ(k) /∈ T or for
no i′ ∈ N Ψi′(%) = ωk. Since ρ(j) ∈ T , %ρ(j) 6=%′ρ(j) and Ψρ(j)(%′T ,%N\T ,K) ρ(j) Ψρ(j)(%,K) ,
necessarily Ψρ(j)(%′T ,%N\T ,K) 6= Ψρ(j)(%,K) and Ψρ(j)(%′T ,%N\T ,K) ∈ D(%ρ(j)). There
are two possibilities:
Case i). For each i < j, ωi = Ψi′(%′T ,%N\T ,K) if and only if ωi = Ψi′(%,K).
Since Ψ satisfies individual rationality and Ψρ(j)(%′T ,%N\T ,K) ∈ D(%ρ(j)), there
is ωj′ /∈ Ωρ(j) such that ωj′ = Ψρ(j)(%′T ,%N\T ,K). By the definition of Ψ, ωρ(j) ∈
D(%′ρ(j′)) \D(%ρ(j′)) . Because %′ρ(j′) 6=%ρ(j′), ρ(j′) ∈ T . However, since Ψ satisfies
individual rationality, Ψρ(j′)(%,K) %ρ(j′) ωρ(j′) ρ(j′) ωρ(j) = Ψρ(j′)(%′T ,%N\T ,K) , which
contradicts ρ(j′) ∈ T .
Case ii). There exists i < j such that either ωi = Ψi′(%′T ,%N\T ,K) 6= Ψi′(%,K) or
ωi = Ψi′(%,K) 6= Ψi′(%′T ,%N\T ,K). Let i∗ be the smallest such i. Note that
by the definition of T and j, i∗ /∈ T . If Ψρ(i∗)(%′T ,%N\T ,K) ρ(i∗) Ψρ(i∗)(%,K) ,
by the definition of generalized age based priority rule, there exists k ∈ T such
that ωi′ /∈ D(%k) and ωi′ ∈ D(%′k) and Ψρ(i∗)(%′T ,%N\T ,K) ∈ Ωk . However, by
individual rationality, Ψk(%,K) k ωi′ = Ψk(%′T ,%N\T ,K), which contradicts k ∈
T . Finally, if Ψρ(i∗)(%,K) %ρ(i∗) Ψρ(i∗)(%′T ,%N\T ,K) , then there exists k′ ∈ T such
that Ψρ(i∗)(%) ∈ Ωk′ and ωρ(i∗) ∈ D(%k′) \ D(%′k′), and by the definition of Ψ and
i∗, ωi∗ = Ψk′(%,K) %k′ Ψk′(%′T ,%N\T ), which contradicts k ∈ T .
Repeating the arguments in the previous paragraphs , we obtain that there are no
T ⊂ N , %∈ DΠ, %′T∈ DΠT and K ′ ∈ K, such that for each i ∈ T :
Ψi(%′T ,%N\T ,K′) i Ψi(%,K′). (2)
Combining equations (1) and (2), and letting K′ = (ΩN\T ,K′T ), we obtain that there are
no T ⊂ N , %∈ DΠ, %′T∈ DΠT , and K′T ∈ ×i∈TKi such that for each i ∈ T
Ψi(%′T ,%N\T , (ΩN\T ,K′T )) i Ψi(%,Ω).
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Before concluding this appendix, it is worth pointing out that our rules are immune
to other form of misrepresentation of the information about the set of donors a part from
withholding some potential donors.
Remark 2. Note that generalized age based priority rules are also immune to manip-
ulation by the introduction of dummy donors. That is, a patient does not improve by
presenting a donor whose kidneys are not compatible with any other patient. That is,
consider patient i and let Ωi = Ω¯i ∪ {ω}. Let %∈ DΠ be such that such that for each
patient j 6= i, ω /∈ D(%j). Then, Ψ(%,Ω) = Ψ(%, (ΩN\{i}, Ω¯i)).
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